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No part of this book has been so subject to obsolescence between first
draft and final version as this chapter. When the first draft was completed
(1966), the Keynesian liquidity preference approach held full sway. It was
widelytaken for granted that more money meant lower interest rates and
a faster rate of monetary growth meant declining interest rates, and
conversely. Hume's warning of two centuries earlier—"Lowness of in-
terest is generally ascribed to plenty of money. But money, however
plentiful, has no other effect, if fixed, than to raise the price of labour"—
was mostly neglected. Irving Fisher's pathbreaking work, dating from
1896, distinguishing between nominal and real interest rates and examin-
ing the empirical role of inflationary expectations was hardly known and
was certainly not part of the received wisdom. Accordingly, our first
draft, which presented a full theoretical analysis incorporating Fisher's
work, was devoted mostly to testing his conclusions with our United
States data.
In the interim there has been a veritable explosion of work in this area,
some stimulated by our first draft, the theoretical part of which was
published in 1968,' but most in reaction to the emergence in the advanced
countries of accelerating monetary growth and rising interest rates that
made it impossible to continue to regard a stable Keynesian liquidity
preference function relating the nominal quantity of money inversely to
nominal interest rates as an adequate tool for analyzing the effect of
monetary changes on interest rates.
The first round of the explosion, like our first draft, consisted largely of
studies along the lines pioneered by Irving Fisher, both redoing his work
1. Milton Friedman, "Factors Affecting the Level of Interest Rates," in Proceedings of
the 1968 Conference on Savings and Residential Financing (Chicago: United States Savings
and Loan League, 1968), pp. 10-27.
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and extending it by introducing more sophisticated devices for estimating
inflationary expectations. These studies largely confirmed Fisher's re-
sults—in particular, his conclusion that inflationary expectations were
formed on the basis of a long past period and only slowly adjusted to
experience. This conclusion was the centerpiece of his work and the basis
for his interpretation of the Gibson paradox—the long-observed positive
correlation between interest rates and the level of prices.
2 But then some
disturbing notes crept in. Results for recent years seemed drastically
different from those for the earlier periods, suggesting that the period of
experience on which expectations were based shortened drastically after
the mid-1960s.
3 In addition, examination of the statistical properties of
the estimates constructed by Fisher and by more recent investigators
raised doubts about their interpretation.
4
A second round of the explosion carried the analysis on to a different
plane by linking it to the theory of "rational expectations" pioneered by
John Muth and the theory of efficient markets developed by Eugene
Fama and others.
5 This approach fully accepts Fisher's theoretical
framework but rejects his hypothesis about the formation of expectations
on the ground that it assumes that profitable market opportunities are
neglected. The "efficient market" approach appears to work well in the
United States for the period since World War II,
6 but unfortunately not
2. Irving Fisher, Appreciation and Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: American Economic
Association, 1896); idem, The Rate of Interest (New York: Macmillan, 1907); idem, The
Theory of Interest (New York: Macmillan, 1930); William E. Gibson and George G.
Kaufman, "The Sensitivity of Interest Rates to Changes in Money and Income," Journal of
Political Economy 76 (June 1968): 472-78; William E. Gibson, "Price-Expectations Effects
oh Interest Rates," Journal of Finance 25 (March 1970): 19-34; Thomas Sargent, "Antici-
pated Inflation and the Nominal Rate of Interest," Quarterly Journal of Economics 86 (May
1972): 212-25. Richard Roll, "Interest Rates on Monetary Assets and Commodity Price
Changes," Journal of Finance 27 (May 1972): 251-78, is a useful survey of these studies.
3. William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky, "Interest Rates and Price Level Changes,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis Review 51 (December 1969): 19-36; William E.
Gibson, "Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations," American Economic Review 62
(December 1972): 854-65; Karen Johnson, "Inflation and Interest Rates: Recent Evi-
dence," Discussion Paper no. 10, Stanford Workshop on the Microeconomics of Inflation
(May 1977).
4. Thomas Sargent, "Interest Rates and Prices in the Long Run: A Study of the Gibson
Paradox," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 5, part 2 (February 1973): 385-449.
5. J. F. Muth, "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements," Econ-
ometrica 29 (July 1961): 313-35. For summaries of studies along these lines, and biblio-
graphical references, see Maurice D. Levi and John H. Makin, "Fisher, Phillips, Friedman,
and the Measured Impact of Inflation on Interest," Journal of Finance 34 (March 1979):
35-52; Kajal Lahiri and Jungsoo Lee, "Tests of Rational Expectations and the Fisher
Effect," Southern Economic Journal 46 (October 1979): 413-24; J. J. Sijben, Rational
Expectations and Monetary Policy (Germantown, Md.: Sijthoof and Noordhoff, 1980).
6. Robert J. Shiller, "Rational Expectations and the Structure of Interest Rates," Ph.D.
diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972; Eugene Fama, "Short-Term Interest479 The Theoretical Analysis
for the United States or the United Kingdom before World War II.
7 Yet
the Gibson paradox seems to prevail for much of the period after as well
as before World War II—though it has apparently disappeared in the
decade of the 1970s. We are left with no single satisfactory interpretation
of that supposedly well-documented empirical phenomenon. We start
this chapter by restating the theoretical analysis that links changes in the
quantity of money with interest rates (sec. 10.1). This part of the chapter
is largely unchanged from our first draft. We then proceed to exploit our
data for the United States and United Kingdom first, to estimate the
average value over a century of the nominal interest rate and the real
interest rate (sec. 10.2), and then, after a digression on the measurement
of yields (sec. 10.3), to estimate the average values in subperiods (sec.
10.4). This leads into the relation between the yields on nominal and
physical assets (sec. 10.5) and between nominal yields, price levels, and
the rate of change of prices (sec. 10.6). We use these results as a back-
ground to evaluate alternative explanations of the Gibson paradox (sec.
10.7), and to interpret an apparent structural change since the end of
World War II (sec. 10.8). Finally we return to the initial theme of the
relation between monetary changes and interest rates, to find that the
statistical results are far less clear-cut than the initial theoretical analysis
(sec. 10.9).
10.1 The Theoretical Analysis
The complexity of the relation between money, interest rates, prices,
and output derives from two main sources: the interaction between
monetary and real disturbances, and the different time patterns of var-
ious reactions to either a monetary or a real disturbance. By a monetary
disturbance we mean an autonomous change in the nominal quantity of
Rates as Predictors of Inflation," American Economic Review 65 (June 1975): 269-82.
However, see Patrick J. Hess and James J. Bicksler, "Capital Asset Prices versus Time
Series Models as Predictors of Inflation," Journal of Financial Economics 2 (December
1975): 341-60; also Charles R. Nelson and G. William Schwert, "Short-Term Interest Rates
as Predictors of Inflation: On Testing the Hypothesis That the Real Rate of Interest Is
Constant," American Economic Review 67 (June 1977): 478-86; Robert J. Shiller and
Jeremy J. Siegel, "The Gibson Paradox and Historical Movements in Real Interest Rates,"
Journal of Political Economy 85 (October 1977): 891-907; Kenneth Garbade and Paul
Wachtel, "Time Variation in the Relationship between Inflation and Interest Rates,"
Journal of Monetary Economics 4 (November 1978): 755-65; and John A. Carlson, "Short-
Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation: Comment," American Economic Review 67
(June 1977): 469-75. These papers criticize Fama's results, primarily on grounds that his
assumption of a constant real rate is incorrect rather than that markets were not efficient.
Fama contends in his reply to his critics ("Interest Rates and Inflation: The Message in the
Entrails," American Economic Review 67 [June 1977]: 487-96), that the "model remains a
useful approximation to the world" (p. 487).
7. See Sargent reference in note 4 above.480 Money and Interest Rates
money or in the conditions determining the nominal quantity of money;
by a real disturbance we mean an autonomous change in the conditions of
production (the production function), or in the supply of productive
resources, or in the conditions of demand for goods and services (includ-
ing the demand for capital goods and for real balances).
To isolate the effect of a monetary disturbance, we shall first trace the
effect of a systematic change in the rate of change of the quantity of
money, on the assumptions (1) that the system starts from a position of
equilibrium, and (2) that any real disturbances are transitory, not sys-
tematic.
8 We shall then consider more briefly the effect of a systematic
real disturbance in a stable monetary framework.
10.1.1 Monetary Disturbances
For the monetary analysis we shall, for definiteness, take the initial
position at time to to be one in which output and the quantity of money
have both been increasing at 3 percent per year, velocity and prices have
both been stable, and the nominal interest rate is 4 percent. Initial
systematic changes in velocity and prices would complicate the exposition
but not alter the analysis. We shall take the systematic monetary change
to be a shift at time to from a steady 3 percent rate of monetary growth to a
steady 8 percent rate. We postpone briefly the question of where the
additional money comes from.
The effect of such a shift from one rate of monetary growth to another
can be usefully classified under three headings: (1) the impact effect,
which includes the Keynesian liquidity effect and a first-round loanable
funds effect; (2) an intermediate-run effect on real income and the price
level; and (3) a long-run price anticipation effect, associated with the
name of Irving Fisher, though he analyzed all three sets of effects.
9 These
effects depend on whether the change in the quantity of money is antici-
pated—in which case the first two sets of effects largely disappear—or is
unanticipated. We shall assume throughout that initially the change is
unanticipated.
Impact Effect
Liquidity effect. Keynes introduced, and the textbooks of the past few
decades have popularized, the liquidity preference function as drawn in
chart 10.1, showing the quantity of money (M) that the public desires to
hold as a function of the interest rate (R). As drawn, the diagram
8. Disturbances range along a continuum from strictly momentary to the longest-lasting;
however, it will simplify the analysis to replace the continuum by a dichotomy.
9. Similarly, Henry Thornton, a century earlier, was aware of all three effects. See An
Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain [hereafter, Paper
Credit of Great Britain] [1802], ed. F. A. von Hayek (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1939), appendix 1, pp. 256-57, 296-97; appendix 3, p. 336.481 The Theoretical Analysis
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Chart 10.1 Keynesian liquidity preference function.
embodies three crucial simplifications. First, measuring "the" nominal
rate of interest on the vertical axis implicitly assumes that the concept of
money for which it is drawn pays no interest; otherwise the vertical axis
should record the difference between "the" rate of interest and the rate
of interest paid on cash balances (either explicitly or implicitly in the form
of services rendered without charge). This simplification reflects Key-
nes's assumption that the financial assets available to be held could be
regarded as consisting either of money bearing no interest or long-term
bonds.
1
0 Second, and more important for our purposes, the horizontal
axis should be in terms of the real stock of money {M/P or M/Y), not the
nominal stock of money. The failure to distinguish the nominal from the
real quantity of money reflects Keynes's assumption that prices could be
taken as rigid and that any effects on income would be on real income.
1
1
We shall relax this assumption in considering the intermediate output and
price effect, as well as the long-run price anticipation effect. Third, the
diagram neglects, as Keynes did not, the role of the level of income in
determining the demand for money. The curve drawn is to be interpreted
as holding for a particular level of income (both nominal and real, given
the fixed price assumption, or real, if the horizontal axis is interpreted as
real money stock). A higher level of income would be associated with a
higher curve, a lower level with a lower curve.
10. See section 2.5.3.
11. See section 2.5.2.482 Money and Interest Rates
The curve as drawn is for a particular time to. For our initial assump-
tions, with M growing at 3 percent a year, the curve is moving over time to
the right at 3 percent per year along with output, and the quantity
measured on the horizontal axis is doing the same. More simply, we may
interpret M as corrected for a 3 percent secular trend.
A shift at time to to an 8 percent rate of monetary growth means that
cash balances will start to rise at a 5 percent a year rate relative to their
previous trend. So far as our present restricted framework is concerned,
nothing will happen initially except that the public will hold the excess
cash—after all, the rise is unanticipated and cash is held as a shock
absorber. But presumably this interval will be brief. As excess cash
accumulates, holders of cash, finding the composition of their portfolios
disturbed, will try to adjust the portfolios by replacing cash with other
assets (including both securities and physical assets). In the process they
will bid up the price of other assets and force down the rate of interest.
This is the pure liquidity effect.
Note that chart 10.1 gives the demand for a stock at a point of time, and
the assumed change is a change in a flow. Hence this effect would involve
not a once-for-all shift from one point to another on the demand curve,
but a sliding down the curve from point A toward, say, point B, which we
may take to correspond to the (trend-adjusted) quantity of money avail-
able at the end of a year. Expressed in terms of a time scale, the behavior
of the rate of interest that would be produced by this effect is as described
in chart 10.2, namely, an indefinite decline.
4%
**•"'•-.... Pure Liquidity Effect
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Chart 10.2 Pure liquidity effect on the interest rate of an increase in the
rate of monetary growth.483 The Theoretical Analysis
Note also the crucial role of the rigid price assumption. Suppose that
we interpret the horizontal axis as referring to MIP, that the shift to an 8
percent rate of monetary growth is announced in advance and fully taken
into account and is simultaneously accompanied by a 5 percent rate of
price rise. Then, if we neglect the price-anticipation effect on the interest
rate considered later, the public would stay at points in chart 10.1, since
real (trend-adjusted) balances would be constant.
The liquidity effect as just described underlay the academic opinion in
the Keynesian era that "easy" money could be regarded as equivalent to
both lower interest rates and more rapid monetary growth. A rather
different effect underlay the corresponding opinion held by bankers,
commercial and central, for a far longer period.
The first-round loanable funds effect. Where does the extra money
come from? How is it put in circulation? In the present financial system, it
is natural to view the increased rate of monetary growth as coming
through the banking system, via larger open market purchases by the
central bank, which add to reserves of commercial banks, inducing them
to expand more rapidly their loans and investments. In the first instance,
therefore, the higher rate of monetary growth appears to take the form of
an increase in the flow supply of loanable funds. Taken by itself, without
allowing for any subsequent effects on ouput or prices of the expenditures
financed with the additional funds, or for any liquidity effect, the increase
in the supply of loanable funds would produce a once-for-all drop in the
interest rate to a new level as in chart 10.3.
Pure First-round Loanable Funds Effect
to time
Chart 10.3 Pure first-round lonable funds effect on the interest rate of an
increase in the rate of monetary growth.484 Money and Interest Rates
Note that there are two slips 'twixt the cup and the lip with respect to
the first-round effect. The first is that the increase in the quantity of
money need not come through an increase in loanable funds. Histori-
cally, it has sometimes come through gold discoveries; currently, it is
likely to come through government spending. In each case, the first-
round effect, as John Stuart Mill stated more than a century ago, will
depend on the initial use made of the new money.
1
2 If, for example, the
monetary increase came through gold production, the first-round effect
would be not on the flow of loanable funds and interest rates, but on the
wages of gold miners and the prices of commodities they bought.
1
3
The second slip is that the rise in the supply of loanable funds via
money issue may not be a net rise. Whether it is depends on the behavior
of the issuers of new money. The new money represents a source of
revenue to the issuers, and there is no reason why the issuers would use
the whole of the increase in revenue to add to their assets. It seems much
more reasonable that they will use revenue from this source in the same
way as other revenue. Even if legal or institutional arrangements require
the issuers to put the money in circulation by purchasing assets, the
issuers can offset the increase in holding of these assets by disposing of
other assets, including the equity in the right to issue money. In that case
there is no first-round effect on loanable funds at all.
The use of new money to finance government spending can be re-
garded as a special case of this slip instead of the first. However, this slip
has much wider relevance, since it is the key issue in the extensive
discussions of forced saving.
1
4
On the empirical level, the two components of the impact effect imply
different relations. The liquidity effect would produce a relation between
the interest rate and the level of the nominal quantity of money or
equivalently between the rate of change in the interest rate and the rate of
monetary growth; the first-round loanable funds effect, between the
12. "It is perfectly true that... an addition to the currency almost always seems to have
the effect of lowering the rate of interest: because it is almost always accompanied by
something which really has that tendency. The currency ... is all issued in the way of loans,
except such part as happens to be employed in the purchase of gold and silver. The same
operation, therefore, which adds to the currency, also adds to the loans Now, though, as
currency, these issues have not an effect on interest, as loans, they have." John Stuart Mill,
Principles of Political Economy, 5th ed. (London: Parker, Son and Bourn, 1862), book 3,
chap. 23, par. 4.
13. See J. H. Cairnes, "Essays toward a Solution of the Gold Question," in Essays in
Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1873), pp. 1-165.
14. See the discussion by Phillip Cagan, The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest
Rates (New York: NBER, 1972), pp. 29-39.
John L. Scadding has examined this issue in greater detail, both theoretically and
empirically, and has concluded that the second slip may well eliminate the bulk of any forced
saving or first-round loanable funds effect. "Monetary Growth and Aggregate Savings,"
Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1974, pp. 27-28, 56-58, 61-68.485 The Theoretical Analysis
interest rate and the rate of change of the nominal quantity of money or,
equivalently, the rate of change of the interest rate and the acceleration
of the quantity of money.
1
5
Combined liquidity and loanable funds effects. Of course, the liquidity
effect and the loanable funds effect operate together so that charts 10.2
and 10.3 cannot be simultaneously correct—in this simplified analysis
there is only one interest rate. The reconciliation is the same as in other
problems of capital theory in which demand and supply depend on both
levels and rate of change.
1
6 The liquidity preference curve depicted in
chart 10.1 must be treated as a function of the rate of change of the
quantity of money—for our present purpose, of the excess of the actual
over the anticipated monetary growth rate.
Chart 10.4 shows the demand situation incorporating this effect—the
right-hand panel for stocks, the left for flows. The stock demand curve is
depicted as a function not only of the level of balances but also of the rate
of change (gM in both panels is to be interpreted as only the unanticipated
component of the rate of change). The flow demand is in its turn a
function of the level of the stock. A shift of the rate of change of the
quantity of money from zero to 5 percent per year produces an immediate
decline in the level of interest rates via a downward shift in the stock
demand curve to intersect with the vertical monetary supply curve at A'.
As the quantity of money grows, the interest rate declines along the new
stock demand curve from A' to B', which as before represents the
temporary position at the end of a year. In the left-hand panel for flows,
the flow demand curve declines as the quantity of money increases, the
market interest rate at B' corresponding to a rate of monetary growth of 5
percent. The result is a time pattern of interest rates which reflects simply
the super-position of chart 10.2 on chart 10.3, as in chart 10.5.
Intermediate Income Effect
As time passes, the initial impact effects will be superseded by more
basic effects. Even though unanticipated, the rising money balances and
15. Cagan in his study of intracycle movements found evidence of the impact effect, in
the form of both a negative synchronous correlation between the level of interest rates and
short-term monetary growth, and a tendency for the rate of interest to decline for some six
months after an acceleration in monetary growth. Cagan interprets his findings as reflecting
primarily a portfolio or liquidity effect, with a first-round loanable funds effect playing a
definite but secondary role (see Cagan, op. cit., Channels of Monetary Effects, chaps. 3,4,
and 7). However, it is not clear that this interpretation is fully satisfactory. See William
Poole, Journal of Political Economy 82 (May/June 1974): 665-68. Cagan recognizes that the
liquidity and loanable-funds effects cannot be distinguished by relating the interest rate to
monetary growth, but argues that his analysis distinguishes between them by introducing
bank credit as an additional variable.
16. For a full analysis, see Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1976), chap.
17, pp. 283-322.486 Money and Interest Rates
Chart 10.4 Liquidity preference curve as a function of rate of change of
quantity of money.
initially lower interest rates will stimulate spending, the spending will
affect both prices and output, and these effects will feed back on the
demand for money. And sooner or later the increase in the rate of
monetary growth will cease to be unanticipated. These effects begin to
operate along with the impact effects as soon as the rate of monetary
growth changes. However, initially they are negligible and build up only
gradually, which is why it is convenient to separate them for purposes of
analysis.
The existence and character of the intermediate income effect does not
depend on any doctrinal position about the way monetary forces affect
the economy. Along strict Keynesian income-expenditure lines, the ini-
tial liquidity and loanable funds effects produce lower interest rates, and
the lower interest rates stimulate business investment, which in turn has a
multiplier effect on spending. Along the broader monetary lines we
prefer, the attempt to correct portfolio imbalance raises the prices of
sources of service flows relative to the prices of service flows themselves,
which leads to an increase in spending on both the service flows and the
production of new sources of service flows. Put differently, reported
interest rates are only a few of a large set of rates of interest, many
implicit and unobservable, that are affected by the changed rate of
monetary growth. As a result, higher monetary growth affects a much
broader area than on the Keynesian view. In either case, a higher rate of
monetary growth will tend, after some lag, to raise the rate of growth of
nominal spending and hence nominal income.
For a moment, retain the Keynesian assumption that the whole of the
acceleration in nominal income takes the form of an acceleration in
output, while prices remain constant. The acceleration in real income will487 The Theoretical Analysis
time
Chart 10.5 Combined impact effect: liquidity plus loanable funds effects
on the rate of interest.
shift the liquidity preference curve of chart 10.1 to the right and also raise
the demand for loanable funds—that is, it will shift the whole set of curves
in the right hand panel of chart 10.4 to the right. These shifts will tend to
raise interest rates, counteracting the downward pressure from the liquid-
ity and first-round effects.
Sooner or later the acceleration in nominal income will have to take the
form of rising prices, since the initial position was assumed to be one of
equilibrium and we have introduced nothing to change the long-run trend
of real income. Indeed, the initial acceleration in real income will pre-
sumably be followed at some point by a deceleration that brings it below
the long-run trend so that the cumulative effect on real income cancels
out. However, the qualitative effect on interest rates is the same whether
the acceleration in nominal income takes the form of an acceleration in
output or in prices. In either case the liquidity preference function, if the
horizontal axis is in nominal terms, shifts to the right. If the horizontal
axis is in real terms, the rising prices will instead be translated into a
slowing or reversal of the right-hand movement of real balances, which
also tends to raise interest rates.
The impact and intermediate effects together would, by themselves,
ultimately produce a return to the initial rate of interest.
1
7 The 8 percent
17. As Henry Thornton put it in 1802, "It seems clear . . . that when the augmented
quantity of paper shall have been for some time stationary, and shall have produced its full
effect in raising the price of goods, the temptation to borrow at five per cent will be exactly
the same as before" (Paper Credit of Great Britain, pp. 256-57).488 Money and Interest Rates
rate of rise in money would be matched by an 8 percent rate of rise in
nominal income, divided into a 5 percent rate of price inflation and a 3
percent rate of real income growth. Real balances and the real supply of
and demand for loanable funds would be at their initial level.
As we know from chapter 2, this is not really a stable long-run equilib-
rium position because of the price anticipation effect. Even if we continue
to abstract from this effect, the time path of interest rates produced by the
combination of the impact and income effects would be not the smooth
path described by curve A in chart 10.6 but the cyclical path involving
overshooting described by curve B. In the first place, both the initial
acceptance of excess balances and the delay between portfolio effects on
interest rates and the effect of changes in interest rates on spending will
produce an initial lag in the reaction of income. In chart 10.7, similar to
chart 2.3 the lag means that, for some time after to, nominal income will
tend to follow line C rather than line B. (Note that these lines are not in
proper scale; their slopes are exaggerated to make the difference between
them more obvious.) This will require a catch-up phase during which
nominal income will have to rise more rapidly than 5 percent a year to get
to line B. The rate of change of nominal income will certainly overshoot,
and this may, though it need not, lead to an overshooting of the interest
rate as well. Second, the initial unanticipated acceleration in output is
likely to be regarded by the public as transitory, as in fact it will prove to
be. It will therefore not raise their permanent income proportionately. If,




Chart 10.6 Combination of impact and income effects on the rate of






Combination of impact and income effects on nominal income.
the liquidity preference curve in charts 10.1 and 10.4 (with the horizontal
axis interpreted as the nominal quantity of money adjusted for trend) will
initially shift to the right in lesser proportion than the rise in (similarly
trend-adjusted) nominal income, though ultimately it will have to shift in
full proportion. This will make for a more rapid rise in nominal income
and a slower upward effect on interest rates in the initial stages when most
of the increase in nominal income is in output.
1
8 This will contribute to an
overshooting in the upward direction of the rate of change of nominal
income and subsequently an overshooting in the downward direction.
For interest rates, it means a slower recovery from the initial decline and
may, though it need not, mean subsequently a rise above the final level.
If, for simplicity, we assume that the reaction pattern of interest rates
to a monetary change is independent of the level of interest rates and of
past and subsequent monetary change, we can express the composite
effect of the impact and intermediate effects in the equation
(1) RiT) = RO + J
 Tb{T- T) gM(T)dT,
where R(T) is the interest rate at time T and gM(T), the rate of monetary
growth at time T and where
(2) /
 Tb(T- T)dT = 0,





if there is no overshooting (curve A in chart 10.6) and
< 0 for (T-T')<71
(4)
< 0forT2<(r-r)<T3
when there is overshooting (curve B in chart 10.6).
Condition (2) assures that the impact and intermediate effects cumu-
late to bring the interest rate back to its initial position, which so far as we
have gone is independent of the rate of monetary growth and is symbol-
ized by Ro. Ro is of course to be regarded not as a numerical constant but
as a function of whatever variables other than monetary growth affect the
interest rate.
Condition (3) expresses the initial negative influence of the liquidity
and first-round effects and the subsequent positive income effect, and
condition (4) expresses these plus the subsequent cyclical adaptation
mechanisms. TX is the time delay between the acceleration of monetary
growth and the subsequent initial trough of the interest rate (or the




When, in our example, prices are rising at 5 percent a year, the public
will sooner or later come to anticipate the price rise. As a result, the 4
percent initial interest rate can no longer be the equilibrium rate. We can
no longer neglect the distinction to which Irving Fisher called attention
between the nominal rate of interest and the real rate of interest. Initially
both equaled 4 percent. If the nominal yield were to stay 4 percent, the
real yield would be -1 percent. Nothing has happened in the real sector,
in the tentative equilibrium resulting from the impact and income effects
alone, to reduce the equilibrium real yield. As the inflation come to be
anticipated, lenders will come to demand higher interest rates and bor-
rowers will be willing to pay higher interest rates. The nominal interest
rate must rise above its initial level.
2
0
19. Cagan in his study has tried to estimate an equation like equation (1) and has
concluded that ix is of the order of magnitude of six months and that the sum of the weights
first totals zero, that is, the interest rate returns to its initial level, after about fifteen months.
Cagan, Channels of Monetary Effects, p. 102.
20. As Henry Thornton put it in 1811, "Accordingly, in countries in which the currency
was in a rapid course of depreciation, supposing that there were no usury laws, the current
rate of interest was often... proportionably augmented" (speech, 7 May 1811, in the debate
in the House of Commons on the Report of the Bullion Committee, in Thornton, Paper
Credit of Great Britain, appendix 3, p. 336).491 The Theoretical Analysis
More formally, designate the nominal interest rate on nominal assets
by R, the real interest rate on nominal assets by p, the rate of change of




(5) P = R-8P-
R is observed directly in the market. It corresponds to the yield to
maturity of a security with specified maturity and interest payments if it is
purchased at the market price, p is not observable in the market at the
time the security is purchased. It can be calculated only after the event,
when the security has matured and the rate of price rise over its life is
known. Hence p cannot be a variable that directly influences behavior.
What influences behavior is the anticipated real yield, or
(6) ?* = R-gl,
where g% is the rate of price change anticipated over the period to the
maturity of the security to which R refers.
Note that a whole spectrum of equations like equations (5) and (6)
exists at any point in time, one for each possible maturity. For conveni-
ence, we can treat these equations as referring to some standard maturity
or, alternatively, to a maturity approaching zero as a limit, so they refer
to a continuous rate of yield at a moment of time. The important consid-
eration in any calculation of nominal and real yields is that the price
change refer to the same period as the holding period for the security. As
the term "holding period" suggests, the yield can be calculated for a
period less than the stated maturity of a security. However, in that case
the price of the security at the end of the holding period will also affect the
yield and will, like the price change, generally not be a known quantity at
the initial date. It too, like the rate of price change, will have to be
determined ex post or treated as an anticipated magnitude.
In our example, initially
R - p = p* =4 percent.
When the public comes to anticipate the 5 percent price rise, R will
have to be higher than initially, and JR will have to differ from p and p* by
5 percentage points. The precise terminal value of R—whether it is 9
percent or higher or lower —depends on what happens to p*. Will it
remain 4 percent?
To answer this question we must examine the effect of the higher value
of R on cash balance holdings. The higher value of R makes interest-
bearing nominal assets more attractive relative to non-interest-bearing
money and so will tend to reduce the real value of cash balances held: at
the terminal position, velocity will be higher than at the initial position.





Chart 10.8 Effect of an increase in rate of monetary growth on the equilib-
rium path of nominal income.
The higher velocity has a number of important effects. In the first
place, as we pointed out in chapter 2, the equilibrium path of nominal
income will not be line B in chart 10.7 but line A in chart 10.8, parallel to
B but higher (like chart 10.7, chart 10.8 is not drawn to scale). This in turn
means that income will at some time or other have to overshoot its
ultimate equilibrium rate of growth for a more basic reason than those
cited earlier.
In the second place, and more important for our purpose, if terminal
real nonhuman wealth held in nonmonetary form were the same as
initially, total real nonhuman wealth would be less. The purely monetary
disturbance we have assumed which produces a steady anticipated infla-
tion has the real effect of lowering the equilibrium real wealth held in the
form of money.
2
2 The reduction in real balances would in turn lead to an
increase in other forms of real nonhuman wealth, either as a substitute for
some of the cash balances that served as a productive resource or as a
replacement for some of the cash balances held by ultimate wealth
holders. Robert Mundell has argued that the result would tend to be a
lower real yield on capital. However, that is by no means clear on a purely
theoretical level. Everything depends critically on the determinants of
the wealth/income ratio desired by ultimate wealth holders. For example,
22. See M. Friedman, Optimum Quantity of Money, and Robert Mundell, "Inflation and





Full effect of an increase in monetary growth on the nominal
interest rate.
if they have a constant internal rate of discount when in wealth equilib-
rium, the ultimate result would be a higher real level of nonmoney
nonhuman wealth, but a sufficiently lower real level of total nonhuman-
wealth that the yield of the smaller amount of now less productive capital
would be the same as before.
2
3
If the real rate were unaffected by inflation, the final pattern of interest
rate behavior for our example would be as depicted in chart 10.9, with
curve A showing a monotonic ultimate approach to the final equilibrium,
curve B, a cyclical approach.
Equation (1) could still be used to describe the composite effect of the
anticipation effect as well as the impact and intermediate effects, but
equation (2) would change, since the integral would equal unity instead
of zero, so that a permanent increase in g\t(T) by unity in equation (1)
would ultimately raise the interest rate by unity. For some purposes, it
23. An even more bizarre possibility is that nonhuman nonmoney capital is sufficiently
complementary with money balances that nonhuman nonmoney capital must decline along
with real money balances to keep the yield constant.494 Money and Interest Rates
might be useful to keep separate the impact and intermediate effects from
the price anticipation effects by writing the equation for the interest rate
as
(7) R(T) = Ro + f





(8) H b{T - T)dV = 0
and
(9) Jj c(T - T)dT = 1 .
Conditions (3) or (4) would apply to the b function, but it is not easy to
write corresponding conditions for the c function, since that depends on
how monetary change is incorporated into price anticipations, a subject
yet to be considered. In this form, Ro equals the real interest rate plus the
hypothetical rate of inflation when the monetary growth rate is zero.
The terminal value of p* might be less than the initial value, in which
case the terminal value of R would be above the initial value by less than
the rate of inflation. In that case the final pattern of interest rate behavior
for our example would be as depicted in chart 10.9 except that curves A
and B would both be lowered somewhat. It is more difficult to alter the
equations in any simple way because there is no reason why the shortfall
from unity in equation (9) should be the same for all rates of monetary
growth.
The effect of moderate rates of anticipated inflation on the real rate is
likely in practice to be negligible. Non-interest-bearing money is a small
fraction of total wealth.
2
4 Even a substantial reduction in real balances
would amount to a small reduction in total nonhuman wealth. In addi-
tion, the real yield on capital is almost surely highly insensitive to the size
of the stock of capital, that is, the demand on the part of producing
enterprises for the real stock of capital is highly elastic. That is the
implication of the rather stable real rate of interest realized on the
average over long periods of time. We conclude that the theoretically
possible effect of anticipated inflation on the equilibrium real rate of
interest can be neglected and the real rate regarded as unaffected by
anticipated inflation.
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24. For the United States, M2 in 1979 was roughly about six months' national income, Mx
was less than three months' national income, and high-powered money was about two-
thirds of one month's national income. Total nonhuman wealth is typically something like
three to five years' national income, so at most M2 would be about one-sixth of total wealth,
Mx about one-twelfth, and high-powered money about one-fortieth.
25. A formal theoretical analysis that presents an explicit model leading to results such as
those in chart 10.9 and equations (8) and (9) is developed in Dean G. Taylor, "The Effects
of Monetary Growth on the Interest Rate," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1972.495 The Theoretical Analysis
A more important practical complication is taxation. Currently in the
United States, nominal interest payments are taxed to the recipient and
deductible in computing taxable income to the borrower. For the real
after-tax yield to the lender to be unaffected by anticipated inflation, the
differential between the nominal and real yield must exceed anticipated
inflation by an amount that depends on the relevant marginal tax rate. If
the marginal tax rate is t, the differential must be 1/(1 -1) times antici-
pated inflation. If the borrower is subject to the same marginal tax rate as
the lender and is permitted to deduct interest payments in computing
taxable income, the same differential keeps the net real rate paid
unchanged.
2
6 With the present high marginal rates of tax, the effect is
potentially of considerable quantitative significance. For example, at a 50
percent rate, the differential between the real and nominal rate would




Unanticipated inflation or, even more important, highly variable infla-
tion is a different matter and almost surely is capable of having a major
effect on real yields. Unanticipated inflation makes the ex-post real yield
differ from the ex-ante real yield and hence makes the real yield obtained
from physical capital differ from the real yield to holders of financial
securities, particularly fixed interest securities. "The" real yield no longer
has any meaning, even if we continue to neglect problems raised by
26. There has been much recent discussion of this issue. See Michael Darby, "The
Financial and Tax Effects of Monetary Policy on Interest Rates," Economic Inquiry 13
(June 1975): 266-76; Jack Carr, James E. Pesando, and Lawrence B. Smith, "Tax Effects,
Price Expectations and the Nominal Rate of Interest," Economic Inquiry 14 (June 1976):
259-69; Martin Feldstein, "Inflation, Income Taxes and the Rate of Interest: A Theoretical
Analysis," American Economic Review 66 (December 1976): 809-20; Vito Tanzi, "Infla-
tion, Indexation and Interest Income Taxation," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly
Review, no. 4 (1975), pp. 319-28; Arthur E. Gandolfi, "Taxation and the 'Fisher Effect,' "
Journal of Finance 31 (December 1976): 1375-86. John A. Carlson, "Expected Inflation
and Interest Rates," Economic Inquiry 17 (October 1979): 597-608, examines empirical
evidence on the tax effect, finding some evidence of its existence during the 1960s, much less
evidence for the 1950s and 1970s. In general the existence of the theoretically expected tax
effect has evaded the several efforts to isolate it and, as yet, no satisfactory explanation for
the failure has been forthcoming.
In an unpublished paper, Arthur E. Gandolfi has examined the effect of different income,
capital gains, and depreciation tax arrangements and has concluded that the existence or
nonexistence of the tax effect may depend on the specific tax arrangements. This is a matter
on which much further work can be expected.
27. Vito Tanzi, "Inflation and the Incidence of Income Taxes on Interest Income: Some
Results for the United States, 1972-74," IMF Staff Papers 24 (July 1977): 500-513, calcu-
lates the interest rates persons in various income brackets would have had to receive in 1972,
1973, and 1974 to have realized a zero net real return after allowing for inflation and taxes,
and the net gain or loss because of the tax treatment—gain to debtors, loss to creditors. He
concludes that, while actual interest rates in 1972 yielded positive net real returns to
creditors in most income brackets, they did not do so for high income groups in 1973 and did
so for almost no groups in 1974. He finds that middle-income groups are net debtors and
therefore gained from the tax treatment; lower- and upper-income groups are net creditors
and therefore lost.496 Money and Interest Rates
different maturities, different degrees of default risk, and so on. These
effects are reinforced if inflation is both high on the average and highly
variable, even if the average rate is largely anticipated. Highly variable
inflation tends to destroy financial intermediation, rendering the capital
market both limited and inefficient—a tendency that is in practice
strongly reinforced by government controls and restrictions on financial
transactions. As a result, not only may the yield to the holder of securities
deviate widely from the yield on the physical capital to which the secur-
ities are linked, but also the real yield on physical capital may differ
widely from one enterprise or industry to another.
Unanticipated inflation has been important for the United States and
the United Kingdom for the period we cover, but not highly variable
inflation. Highly variable inflation has been much more important for less
developed countries, particularly in South America. However, highly
variable inflation has more recently plagued the United Kingdom and the
United States as well.
The general effect of anticipated inflation on nominal interest rates is
apparent from comparisons across countries: nominal interest rates are
invariably higher in countries that have experienced substantial inflation
for some time than in countries that have not. But the precise relation is
much more difficult to pin down. The major problem is the difference
between actual and anticipated inflation, so that any analysis requires
combining a hypothesis about the formation of anticipations with a
hypothesis about the behavior of real rates and the relation between real
and nominal interest rates.
If price change were perfectly and instantaneously anticipated, rapid
rates of price rise would be associated with high nominal interest rates
and low rates of price rise with low nominal interest rates, but there
would be no correlation between high prices and high interest rates or
between rising prices and rising interest rates; yet the Gibson paradox is
the allegation that such a correlation does exist.
Chart 10.10 illustrates this point. Suppose that the historical record of
prices were the one plotted, where the ordinate is the logarithm of price
so that straight lines correspond to constant rates of price change. If this
price pattern were fully anticipated and were the only factor altering the
nominal interest rate, the nominal interest rate would be high for periods
a and c and low for periods b and d, as shown by the dashed steps. The
difference in height between the two steps would be the rate of inflation in
steps a and c plus the rate of deflation in steps b and d. There would be no
correlation between the level of prices and the level of interest rates: half
the time, a high interest rate would be associated with an above-average
price level; half the time, with a below-average price level; and similarly
for low interest rates. There would be perfect correlation between the
level of interest rates and the rate of change of the price level.497 The Theoretical Analysis
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Chart 10.10 The effect of perfectly and imperfectly anticipated price
changes on the interest rate.
This description applies rigorously only to the continuous interest rate
at a moment of time. For a finite maturity, the interest rate at any point in
time would reflect the rate of price change expected over the period from
then to maturity. If price changes were correctly anticipated, the interest
rate would equal a moving average of the step function in chart 10.10, the
length of the average would be equal to the maturity, and the average
would be plotted at the initial date of the moving average. The result
would be to smooth the step function and to shift its turning dates earlier.
The actual relation, as we shall see below, is more like the wavy dotted
line in chart 10.10 than like the step function. The turning dates are in
practice shifted later, not earlier. To explain this pattern requires intro-
ducing discrepancies between actual and anticipated inflation, or move-
ments in real interest rates, or some combination of the two. The particu-
lar explanation of this phenomenon, termed the Gibson paradox by J. M.
Keynes, that has received most attention is the one offered by Irving
Fisher. It combines an assumed rough constancy in the real rate with a
lagged adjustment of price anticipations to the actual price movement.
We shall discuss his and other explanations in greater detail in section
10.7, after we have first established in sections 10.2 through 10.6, as best
we can, the phenomena to be explained.
10.1.2 Real Disturbances
The monetary disturbances analyzed in the preceding section have
systematic effects on real interest rates. An unanticipated acceleration in498 Money and Interest Rates
monetary growth to a new steady rate produces at first a decline in the
ex-post real instantaneous rate realized by lenders, then a rise, and
ultimately a return roughly to its initial level. In the interim the ex-post
real rate is likely to fluctuate above and below that level. The ex-ante real
rate follows a similar qualitative course, but the timing may be quite
different. The ex-post and ex-ante real rates on loans of different dura-
tions will tend to be appropriately weighted averages of the instantaneous
rates.
It would be gratifying to be able to present a parallel systematic
analysis for real disturbances. However, there is no way to do so because
the pattern of effects on nominal and real interest rates depends on the
character of the real disturbance. For that reason this section will be
briefer and vaguer than the preceding and purely illustrative.
Compare for example, two hypothetical real disturbances: first, a
Wicksellian or Schumpeterian surge of innovations that raises the real
yield on a wide range of physical capital; second, innovations in the use of
cash balances of the kind Irving Fisher expected to produce an upward
trend in the transactions velocity of circulation of money. Initially, for
both, assume given monetary conditions in the sense of a given rate of
monetary growth.
A Surge of Innovations Raising the Yield on Physical Capital
An upward shift in the stock demand for capital in response to a surge
of innovations will be accompanied by a similar shift in the flow demand
curve for investment funds that will tend to raise nominal interest rates,
which, in turn, will tend to raise the velocity of circulation of money. As
in response to a monetary disturbance, this effect will be spread over
time. The higher velocity will mean for a time a more rapid rise in
nominal income which, given that it is unanticipated, will initially be
reflected primarily in greater output rather than in prices. At this stage
the rise in the nominal interest rate will be accompanied by a rise in both
the ex-post and the ex-ante real rates. As time passes, the higher nominal
income will be translated into higher prices, output will decline to its
earlier level and, for a time, below it. Ex-post real rates will decline as the
price adjustment occurs and may fall below the initial level. However, the
rise in velocity is a once-for-all effect. There is nothing in the process so
far considered to produce a continuing rise in velocity. Hence, when
velocity has adjusted, prices will resume their prior rate of change, and
the differential between nominal and real interest rates will return to its
prior level. Both nominal and real interest rates will continue at higher
than initial levels until the increased stock demand for physical capital is
gradually satisfied by the higher savings called forth by the higher interest
rate, possibly reinforced by saving out of the higher income generated by499 The Theoretical Analysis
the assumed surge of innovations.
2
8 Depending on the wealth-holding
preferences of the community, interest rates may ultimately return to
their initial level or may settle at a higher or, possibly, even a lower level.
For our purpose, the important phenomenon is that the real disturb-
ance produces an initial rise, then a later decline in nominal and real
interest rates, with all sorts of possible detours in between.
A different monetary system, of the kind assumed by Wicksell, for
example, would alter the results in detail but not in broad outline. In
Wicksell's model, the initial rise in the "natural" rate would be resisted
by banks, which would lead to a rise in the initially assumed rate of
monetary growth, thereby partly reinforcing, partly offsetting the rise in
velocity. But this effect too would tend to be a once-for-all phenomenon
rather than a continuing process.
A Surge of Innovations in the Use of Cash Balances
The initial effect on interest rates of a surge of innovations in the use of
cash balances (e.g., faster computer clearing, reducing average balances
required) would be precisely the opposite of the Wicksellian surge of
innovations. The innovations would have the same effect as more rapid
monetary growth, tending to lower nominal interest rates through the
attempt of holders of now-redundant cash to acquire interest yielding
assets. Velocity would tend to rise as in the preceding case, but the rising
velocity would itself be an autonomous force, not a response to a higher
interest rate, and so would tend simultaneously to make for higher prices,
as in the preceding case, but lower interest rates. If we assume, with
Fisher, an upward trend in velocity rather than a once-for-all shift, the
effects on interest rates would be precisely the same as that attributed in
the preceding section to an increase in the rate of monetary growth,
which means that ultimately nominal interest rates would settle at a
permanently higher level, though real interest rates would return to their
initial level.
The response of interest rates to this surge of innovations is very nearly
the reverse of the pattern in response to the Wicksellian surge.
Perhaps this comparison will explain why we do not embark on a
detailed analysis of real disturbances comparable to our earlier discussion
of the effect of a more precisely specifiable monetary disturbance. We
shall consider real disturbances further in section 10.7, which examines
alternative explanations of the Gibson paradox.
10.1.3 Conclusion
The preceding general theoretical analysis of this chapter will perhaps
prepare readers for a major feature of the empirical findings that follow:
28. The exact process is highly complicated. See M. Friedman, Price Theory.500 Money and Interest Rates
the complexity of the behavior of interest rates and the difficulty of
identifying any simple and consistent pattern connecting interest rates
with price levels, rates of price change, or rates of monetary growth.
Because interest rates connect the future with the present, they are
necessarily sensitive to judgments about the future, about the formation
of which we have little confirmed knowledge. Because interest rates
connect large stocks to relatively small flows, they can display wide
variations as a result of apparently trivial changes. Because they connect
holders of financial assets to holders of physical assets, they are sensitive
to the process whereby nominal and real magnitudes are linked. Finally,
the same disturbance can have effects in opposite directions over differ-
ent periods of time, so the observed behavior of interest rate is sensitive
to variations in the reaction time of different groups in the population.
Like prices and money, interest rates are a pervasive and crucial
phenomenon entering into every aspect of economic activity. But the
special features just mentioned make their empirical behavior an even
more challenging subject of scientific study.
10.2 Average Yields
Table 10.1 summarizes the average yields for over a century on various
categories of assets. For this purpose we have used three measures of
yield: (1) a short-term rate—the rate on commercial paper (sixty to
ninety days through 1923, four to six months since) for the United States
and the rate on three-month bank bills for the United Kingdom; (2) a
long-term rate—the yield to maturity on high-grade corporate bonds for
the United States and the consol yield (coupon divided by price) for the
United Kingdom; (3) the proxy for the nominal yield on physical assets
that we used in chapter 6 (gY)—namely, the rate of change of nominal
income.
2
9 We shall, for simplicity, refer to this proxy as "the yield on
physical assets."
For the more than a century that our data cover, the several average
yields display a relation consistent with expectations from earlier studies.
1. For both the United States and the United Kingdom, the short-term
nominal yield is less than the long-term nominal yield—by 0.68 percent-
29. For the United States we have experimented also with the two other interest rates on
nominal assets: the call money rate and the basic yield on long-term bonds. The results
largely duplicated those for the two in table 10.1: hence we have omitted them.
For the proxy yield, and also the rates of change of prices and money, we have departed
from our usual procedure of calculating them from exponential trends fitted to triplets of
phases. Instead they are calculated as the average of the annual rates of change within
phases. The reason for this departure is to make them as closely comparable as possible to
the matching interest rates. Interest rates are initially observed as rates, hence their phase
averages are derived solely from rates within the several phases. Our notation for these rates
of change is gY-A, gp-A, and gM.A.501 The Theoretical Analysis
age points for the United States, 0.77 for the United Kingdom. This
difference presumably reflects a liquidity premium that various more




2. For both the United States and the United Kingdom, the nominal
yield on physical assets is between the nominal yields on short- and
long-term securities—about halfway between for the United States, close
to the long yield for the United Kingdom. In that mythical stationary
state in which arbitrage between physical and nominal assets is effective,
all assets of the same maturity and risk would provide the same return.
These results therefore add to our confidence that gY can be treated as an
approximation to the nominal yield on physical assets, and also that the
physical assets for the yield on which it proxies are intermediate in
maturity and risk between short- and long-term securities. As we shall see
later, this equality does not hold for short periods. Indeed, the difference
between the nominal yield on nominal assets and the nominal yield on
physical assets is a sensitive index of economic conditions.
3. The*nominal yields average about 0.5 percentage points higher for
the United States than for the United Kingdom—0.68 points for the short
rate, 0.59 points for the long rate, 0.33 points for the yield on physical
assets. However, United States and United Kingdom yields are not
directly comparable because of changes in the exchange rate. The price of
the pound in dollars at the end of the period was lower than at the
beginning, the rate of decline averaging 0.94 percent per year. Hence, a
hypothetical long-lived Englishman who had purchased United States
assets at the beginning of the period, held them throughout the period,
and converted them back to pounds at the end of the period would have
earned in pounds 0.94 percentage points more than the nominal United
States yield given in table 10.1. Alternatively, an American who did the
same with United Kingdom assets would have earned in dollars 0.94
percentage points less than the nominal United Kingdom yield. The
30. The literature on the term structure is immense. The most careful examinations of the
existence of a liquidity premium are perhaps Reuben Kessel, The Cyclical Behavior of the
Term Structure of Interest Rates, Occasional Paper 91 (New York: NBER, 1965); Phillip
Cagan, "A Study of Liquidity Premiums on Federal and Municipal Government Secur-
ities," in Essays on Interest Rates, vol. 1, ed. P. Cagan and J. Guttentag (New York: NBER,
1969), pp. 107-42. These authors view the liquidity premium as reflecting the value of the
services of short-term securities as substitutes for money balances. An alternative view is
that long-term securities carry a yield premium, given an aversion to the risk of capital
losses, resulting from a general belief that interest rates return to their "normal" level over
the long run, with higher yields on long- relative to short-term securities when interest rates
are relatively low because long securities are then especially subject to capital losses, and the
converse when rates are high. For this view see J. Van Home, "Interest-Rate Risk and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Political Economy 73 (August 1965): 344-51;
Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," American
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difference between the yields in the two countries measured in compara-
ble terms is therefore roughly 1.27 to 1.62 percentage points rather than
0.33 to 0.68 percentage points. This difference is consistent with the net
outflow of capital from the United Kingdom to the United States for
much of the period, offset not by private return flow induced by interest
rate differentials but by government repatriation of capital during World
Wars I and II.
4. The ex-post real yield has been calculated from the nominal yield
for all three categories of assets simply by subtracting the rate of change
of prices (the implicit price index); hence the relation among the three
ex-post real yields is the same as the relation among the nominal yields.
However, as between the two countries, the real yields are directly
comparable. No further adjustment for exchange rate changes is required
because all yields are, as it were, expressed in the prices, and hence
exchange rate, of a given base date. The difference between the two
countries is 1.74 percentage points for the short rate, 1.63 for the long
rate, and 1.38 for the yield on physical assets, somewhat higher than the
differentials estimated in the preceding paragraph. The differentials are
somewhat higher because the excess rate of rise of prices in the United
Kingdom of 1.04 percentage points per year is slightly higher than the
0.94 percentage point per year decline in the exchange rate. The near-
identity of these two numbers is to be expected from the theory of
purchasing power parity. The United Kingdom's shift from a capital-
exporting to a capital-importing country might have been expected to
make the excess rate of rise of prices greater than the rate of decline in the
exchange rate, and, according to our estimates, this is what happened
(see sec. 6.8).
5. The average real yield varies from 2.6 to 3.3 percent for the differ-
ent categories of assets for the United States, from 0.9 to 1.7 percent for
the United Kingdom.
6-9. Excluding the wartime phases, which reduces the period covered
from 103 years to 88 for the United States and from 102 to 87 for the
United Kingdom, has a minor though systematic effect on the results.
6. The excess of long rates over short rates is reduced slightly, from 0.7
percentage points for the United States and 0.8 for the United Kingdom
to 0.6 for both countries.
7. The differential between the two countries remains about 0.5 per-
centage points for nominal yields unadjusted for the change in the ex-
change rate and about 1.25 percentage points for real yields. Since ex-
change rate changes were greatest in wartime phases, the decline in the
price of the pound in dollars in nonwar phases was 0.21 percent per year,
only about a fifth of the decline over the full period.
8. The major change is that the yield on physical assets is decidedly504 Money and Interest Rates
lower for the nonwar phases alone than the yield on both short- and
long-term nominal assets—roughly one percentage point lower than the
short rate. The major reason is that the war phases are inflationary
phases. More than half the average rate of inflation for the period as a
whole is accounted for by the wartime phases. Prices in the United States
rose on the average by 0.58 percent per year during the nonwar phases
alone, compared with 1.54 for the period as a whole, and in the United
Kingdom by 1.23 percent per year compared with 2.58. As we shall see
below, yields on physical assets have tended to be higher than yields on
nominal assets during inflationary periods and lower during deflationary
periods. A secondary reason is the deliberate government policy of
holding down interest rates during World War II, so that the average
nominal yields on nominal assets are higher during nonwar phases than
during all phases, while our measure of the nominal yield on physical
assets is lower.
9. The changed difference between the return on nominal and physical
assets reflects primarily a different behavior in war and nonwar phases of
the returns on nominal, not on physical assets. The nominal return on
physical assets is higher for all phases than for all nonwar phases by
roughly the differential rate of inflation, so that the real return on
physical assets is about the same for all phases as for nonwar phases only.
By contrast, the nominal return on nominal assets is about the same for
all phases as for all nonwar phases, so that the real return is appreciably
less for all phases. The wartime periods simply highlight a point that we
shall examine below for other periods: yields on nominal assets for the
most part behave as if price changes up or down were unanticipated.
We have included in the table the average rate of change of the
quantity of money, both as something of an alternative proxy for the
nominal yield on physical assets and because our major interest is the
relation of monetary growth to interest rates. We know from earlier
chapters that the rate of monetary growth is closely related to the rate of
growth of nominal income, and that is about all these averages show.
Table 10.1 also gives measures of the variability of the yields from
phase to phase. The most interesting feature of these standard deviations
is that, whereas for nominal assets nominal yields are less variable than
real yields, the reverse is true for physical assets. The reason is straight-
forward. The nominal yields on nominal assets, at least as measured here
(see further discussion of holding period yields below), are contracted in
advance; they are both ex post and ex ante. They are affected by antici-
pated price changes but not by unanticipated price changes. The ex-post
real yield reflects in full the unanticipated price changes, and the high
variability of the ex-post real yield indicates that the actual price changes
have been largely unanticipated. For physical assets, on the other hand,
neither the nominal nor the real yield, as measured here, is contracted in
advance. Both are subject to random variation. However, price changes505 A Digression on the Measurement of Yields
affect both cost and return on physical assets; there is a measure of
automatic indexing, as it were. Hence, the real yield tends to be less
variable than the nominal yield.
The bottom section of table 10.1 shows the correlation between the
various yields. Short- and long-term yields on nominal assets both real
and nominal are highly correlated for both countries. The correlations
between yields on nominal and physical assets, both real and nominal,
show an interesting difference for the two countries. For the United
States they are consistently negative, though generally not significantly
different from zero; for the United Kingdom, seven out of eight are
positive, and four are sufficiently large to differ significantly from zero.
However, all correlations for both the United States and the United
Kingdom are lower in size than between short and long nominal rates.
3
1
However adequate the arbitrage between physical and nominal assets
may be over a century, it appears to be weak for periods as short as a
phase—which highlights one of the key problems requiring attention.
10.3 A Digression on the Measurement of Yields
The precise time reference of the yields for individual phases and,
connected with that, their ex-post or ex-ante character, is not important
for averages for long periods but is important for correlations, standard
deviations, and the analysis in the rest of this chapter of relations over
briefer periods.
Consider, first, nominal yields on nominal assets. The basic observa-
tions averaged to obtain the rates we have used are the yield to maturity
calculated from the market price of a security at a point in time. That is
both the ex-ante and the ex-post yield for a purchaser of the security who
holds it to maturity. It is neither for a purchaser who intends to hold it or
does hold it for a shorter period. For such a purchaser, the yield depends
also on the price of the security when it is sold. For our purposes, this
difference between holding period yield and yield to maturity can safely
be neglected for commercial paper or bank bills, since our basic observa-
tions are averages for a year, and we further average these into phase
averages, so the timing problem is trivial.
3
2 For long-term bonds the
31. All correlations between real yields have an upward statistical bias, because the same
value of gP is subtracted from the two yields correlated. Insofar as gP is incorrectly
measured, this introduces a common statistical error into both variables.
32. As a check on this presumption, we calculated for the United States the correlation
from 1926 to 1974 for annual data between the annual holding-period yield on Treasury
bills, as calculated by Ibbotson and Sinquefield, and the commercial paper rate. Despite the
difference between the two securities, the correlation is .988. We do not use the Treasury
bill series in our analysis because it is available for only part of the period we study. See
Roger C. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield, "Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: Year-by-
Year Historical Returns (1926-1974)," Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 49,
no. 1 (January 1976): 11-47.
In addition, we have experimented for the United States with the use of call money rates,
which are one-day rates. The correlation with the commercial paper rate is high.506 Money and Interest Rates
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Chart 10.11 Nominal yields on nominal assets for annual holding periods
and to maturity, annually, United States, 1926-74.
difference is far from trivial, since the period to maturity is substantial
relative to the time units we use in our analysis. Chart 10.11 indicates the
difference for annual data for the United States from 1926 to 1974. The
yield to maturity of long-term bonds behaves like the commercial paper
rate—as the high correlations in table 10.1 foreshadow. But the annual
holding-period yield fluctuates widely. The yield to maturity cuts through
the annual holding period like a trend series, though the two series are
not correctly dated relative to one another.
3
3
The annual holding-period yield is strictly an ex-post yield. It cannot be
observed or known in advance. Its wide variability reflects this feature
plus the large unanticipated element in the market price of the securities.
We have no corresponding direct evidence for the United Kingdom,
but none is necessary. The consol yield is never strictly a realized holding-
period yield, though obviously it approaches one as the holding period
lengthens indefinitely. The annual, or other short-term holding period,
yield of the consols fluctuates widely as the price of the consol varies.
For real yields on nominal assets there is the additional problem of
matching the period for which the price change is calculated with either
the period to maturity or the holding period. Again, no significant prob-
lem arises for the short-term rate. Our procedure of subtracting the
33. The yield to maturity series is plotted at the initial date whereas, to correspond in
timing to the holding period series, it should be plotted later by an interval corresponding to
some concept of average effective maturity.507 A Digression on the Measurement of Yields
average price change from one calendar year to the next from the average
rate during the second of those years is not accurate; the price change
should be for a year beginning seven and a half to eight and a half months
later than the calendar year, but that error is negligible for our purpose.
However, for long-term bonds, our procedure introduces serious error,
since the nominal yield is calculated to maturity, but the rate of price
change is not.
The real yields on nominal assets are ex-post yields. To get ex-ante
yields requires some advance independent estimate of the anticipated
rate of price change.
Given the very high correlation between short- and long-term nominal
yields to maturity, the computational problems involved in correctly
computing real yields to maturity, and the large erratic element in hold-
ing-period yields on long-term securities, we have bypassed these prob-
lems in the rest of this chapter by using only the short-period rates for our
detailed analysis. Our interest is not in the term structure of rates but in
the relation of monetary change to interest rates. For that purpose it
seems adequate to use the short rate as a proxy for the whole structure of
rates. In effect, that is equivalent to taking the average remaining matur-
ity of the short-term instrument whose yield we use as the ex-ante holding
period the return for which is being studied. Arbitrage across maturities
assures that ex-ante yields for other maturities will differ only by liquidity
or risk premiums, and these are not our primary concern.
For nominal yields, we can identify the ex-post with the ex-ante return,
neglecting, for the series we use, the default risk. For real yields, even for
short-term securities, we cannot do so. True, prices tend to move rather
sluggishly; so for short periods it might be supposed that anticipated price
movements will not differ much from actual price movements. However,
the shorter the period, the smaller the yield, not as an annualized per-
centage, but as a percentage of the capital value. There is no reason to
suppose a priori that the error in estimating price change declines any
more rapidly than the yield. The pure measurement error in price change
must rise as a fraction of the price change as the period shortens, but this
component would tend to average out in our annual and even more phase
averages and hence would not by itself be a reason for rejecting the
identity of ex-post and ex-ante real yields.
For nominal and real yields on physical assets, the timing problem does
not arise. Our proxies can be regarded as corresponding to holding-
period yields. However, since they are based on differences between the
logarithms of calendar year nominal and real income series, they are
dated as of the end of the year; that is, they correspond to fiscal years
ending 30 June rather than to calendar years. There is therefore a
six-month difference in dating between the proxy series and the series on
yields on nominal assets. Given that our time unit is generally a phase,508 Money and Interest Rates
this timing difference will generally be of minor significance.
3
4 Our prox-
ies are necessarily ex post not ex ante, and there seems no way of getting a
corresponding ex-ante measure.
The major measurement problem that arises for our proxies is whether
they are valid proxies for the nominal and real yield on physical assets.
The successful use of the nominal proxy in the demand functions of
chapter 6, and the closeness of the averages for a century to the corre-
sponding averages for the yields on nominal assets, is substantial evi-
dence in their favor but can hardly be regarded as conclusive. We have
therefore made a number of additional tests by comparing our proxies
with two alternative estimates of returns on real assets for the United
States for the period 1929 to 1969: (1) the Ibbotson and Sinquefield series
of annual holding-period return on common stocks; and (2) the rate of
return on capital for the United States private national economy, as
estimated by Christensen and Jorgenson.
3
5 Chart 10.12 plots our proxies
against these series, in panel A for nominal yields, in panel B for real
yields, and table 10.2 gives means, standard deviations, and correlations
for the several series.
3
6
Our proxies compare very well with the Christensen and Jorgenson
(CJ) rate of return on capital, having roughly similar mean values, a high
positive correlation of nominal yields, and a low though statistically
significant positive correlation for real yields. The main difference is that
the CJ rate of return is much less variable, particularly the CJ real rate of
return. Perhaps that means that it is closer to an ex-ante than to an
ex-post return, perhaps it simply reflects the large measure of smoothing
and interpolation that has gone into the construction of the CJ rate of
return measures.
The common stock holding-period yields are much more variable than
either of the others—hardly surprising given the volatility of the stock
market prices from which they are derived. The high mean yield, double
or more than double that shown by the other two measures, may be a
return for risk or an artifact of the selective nature of the stock market or
period. The correlation between the stock market returns and either of
the others is trivial, though it is positive for three out of four comparisons.
So far as this evidence goes, it strengthens our confidence in the proxies
as valid measures of returns on physical assets. The disagreement with
common stock yields seems more reasonably interpreted as an indication
34. We have tested this proposition by computing phase averages from fiscal year
interest-rate observations. The results were sufficiently similar to those derived from
calendar year observations that we decided for simplicity to retain the latter.
35. Laurits R. Christensen and Dale W. Jorgenson, "U.S. Income, Saving, and Wealth,
1929-1969," Review of Income and Wealth, December 1973, pp. 344-45.
36. Though these charts cover 1926-74 for the proxies and holding-period returns, the
Christensen-Jorgenson estimates are available only for 1929 to 1969, which is why table 10.2
is restricted to that period.509 A Digression on the Measurement of Yields
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Chart 10.12 Three measures of yields on United States physical assets,
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Table 10.2 Three Measures of Yields on Physical Assets, United States Annual
Data, 1929-69
Physical assets (proxy)
Common stocks, annual holding period
CJ rate of return on capital
Physical assets (proxy)
Common stocks
CJ rate of return
Physical assets (proxy) and
common stocks
Physical assets (proxy) and
CJ rate of return
Common stocks and


























of the highly special character of the subset of physical assets reflected in
stock market securities than as evidence against our proxies for what they
purport to be: yields on the broad spectrum of assets, both human and
nonhuman, whatever the financial claims, if any, that are their counter-
part.
One further minor bit of evidence is that the correlation between the
commercial paper rate and the CJ nominal rate of return on capital, as
between the commercial paper rate and our proxy, is essentially zero.
10.4 Yields in Subperiods
Table 10.3 repeats table 10.1 for a series of subperiods, except that we
have omitted the long rates. We have subdivided the pre-World War I
period into the period before 1896, when prices were generally falling,
and the subsequent period, when prices were generally rising, have
separated out the war periods, and have treated the interwar period as
one unit, because of the paucity of observations, even though the be-
havior of prices varied greatly during these nearly two decades. As the
mean rate of change of prices shows, the interwar period was certainly on
the average a period of falling prices. The postwar period requires no
subdivision. It clearly is a period of generally rising prices.
We therefore have two periods of generally falling prices (pre-1896,
interwar), two wartime periods of rising prices, and two peacetime























































































































































































































O U513 Yields in Subperiods
The division into periods adds to the conclusions derived from the
averages for the period as a whole in respect to, first, the differences
between the United States and the United Kingdom; and second, the
effect of price experience on the differential between the yields on
nominal and on physical assets.
10.4.1 United States versus United Kingdom
For the period as a whole, the short rate averaged 0.7 percentage
points higher for the United States than for the United Kingdom, or 1.6
percentage points higher if allowance is made for changes in the exchange
rate, which is equivalent to allowing for the differential behavior of prices
in the two countries.
Table 10.4, which records the United States-United Kingdom dif-
ferential for the various subperiods and yields, shows that the excess of
the United States nominal short rate over the United Kingdom rate
declined steadily from period to period, particularly sharply from the first
to the second. This sharp and regular decline can in principle be attri-
buted to any of three factors: (1) a decline in the differential real yield
available on physical assets in the two countries; (2) a change in the
relative behavior of prices, as reflected in the exchange rate; (3) a change
in the effectiveness of financial intermediation leading to a relative de-
cline in the United States in the differential between nominal yields on
nominal assets and on physical assets.
All three factors apparently played a role, though each at a different























































"Commercial paper rate for United States, rate on three-month bank bills for United
Kingdom.
bRate of change of income.514 Money and Interest Rates
interwar period; the second, for the decline from the interwar to the
postwar period; and the third, for the decline from the first to the second
prewar period.
1. The final column of table 10.4 indicates that, excluding war periods,
the excess of the real yield in the United States over that in the United
Kingdom was about one percentage point higher before World War I
than after.
3
7 This clearly matches the 0.96 percentage point decline in the
United States-United Kingdom nominal short-rate differential from the
1896-World War I period to the interwar period.
2. The sharp further decline of 1.98 percentage points in the nominal
short-rate differential from the interwar to the postwar period corre-
sponds fairly closely to the 2.39 percentage point decline in the rate of
price rise in the United States relative to that in the United Kingdom.
3
8
This differential rate of price decline was reflected in the depreciation of
the British pound relative to the United States dollar by 1.51 percent per
year.
3. Finally, the sharp fall in the nominal short-rate differential from the
first period to the second period cannot be attributed to item 1, since
there is no corresponding decline in nominal differential yields on physi-
cal assets—rather, there is a rise. It cannot be attributed to item 2,
because the pound appreciated by 0.52 percent per year between the two
periods, reflecting differential behavior of average rates of price change,
which would work against the change in the interest differential that
actually occurred.
3
9 Our first impression was that item 3 must have been
triggered by the substantial increase in the degree of financial sophistica-
tion in the United States relative to that in the United Kingdom that we
identified in chapter 6, and to which we attributed much of the differen-
tial behavior of velocity in the United States and the United Kingdom up
to about 1903. It seemed reasonable that increased financial sophistica-
tion would also produce a decline in the market rate of interest on
securities like commercial paper traded in active financial markets.
37. As a rough estimate, a simple average of the excess for the two pre-World War I
periods is 1.53, for the interwar and post-World War II periods, 0.49, or a difference of 1.04
percentage points. Alternatively, the difference between the prewar and interwar periods of
falling prices is 0.97, between the prewar and postwar periods of rising prices, 1.11.
38. As table 10.3 shows, during the interwar period prices fell in the United States by 1.76
percentage points, in the United Kingdom, by 1.70 percentage points, or by .06 percentage
points more in the United States. Prices rose in the United States during the postwar period
by 3.17 percent; in the United Kingdom, by 5.62 percent, or by 2.45 percentage points less in
the United States. Consequently, United States prices fell relative to those in the United
Kingdom in both periods, but by 2.39 percentage points more after World War II than in the
interwar period.
39. Before 1896 prices fell more rapidly in the United States than in the United Kingdom;
after 1896 they rose more rapidly in the United States than in the United Kingdom. The
differential changed by 2.18 percentage points. This factor alone should have made for a rise
in the United States interest rate relative to the United Kingdom, not a fall.515 Yields in Subperiods
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Chart 10.13 Excess of United States commercial paper rate over United
Kingdom rate on bank bills, annually, 1867-1914.
However, chart 10.13, which plots the United States-United Kingdom
differential year by year, contradicts this interpretation. That chart does
not show a gradual reduction in the differential such as might be expected
from a gradual growth in financial sophistication. On the contrary, it
shows an abrupt drop from one level, 1874 through 1896, to another
level, 1897 to 1914, with sizable year-to-year fluctuations about those
levels. The peaks in 1893 and 1896 suggest an explanation for the drop in
level. The peak in 1893 is connected with the banking panic of that year.
The initial banking difficulties reinforced fears, endemic before 1896
because of silver politics, that the United States would go off gold and the
dollar would depreciate. The restriction of cash payments by banks after
July produced a premium in the market on currency (i.e., it took more
than $100 of deposits to buy $100 of currency), which was equivalent to a
depreciation of the United States dollar vis-a-vis the British pound, for a
time converting the fear into a reality. The peak in 1896 is connected with
the capital flight of that year accelerated by Bryan's nomination, which
greatly strengthened fears that the United States would leave gold.
4
0 In
both cases, fear of devaluation meant that owners of United Kingdom
capital were reluctant to participate in the United States short-term
40. A Monetary History, pp. 107-13.516 Money and Interest Rates
market except at a substantial premium. The election of McKinley
changed the situation drastically. It made United States retention of the
gold standard secure for the time being, and the subsequent flood of gold
from South Africa, Alaska, and Colorado removed all doubts.
The sudden reversal of confidence in the sterling value of the dollar had
the effect of an equally sudden improvement in the effectiveness of the
financial market. The United States short-term market became linked, as
it were, to the United Kingdom market as an equal participant rather
than as a poor relative. The gradual improvement in the United States
market by itself, which doubtless was proceeding, was overshadowed by
the drastic one-time shift to a new level. Hereafter, financial intermedia-
tion was available at lower cost and could be expected to reduce the
differences in rates charged in different markets.
The United States-United Kingdom nominal short-rate differential for
the pre-1896 period in table 10.4 averages 1.08 percentage points higher
than for the 1896-World War I period. We shall take this as measuring
the magnitude of the shift.
One point about this shift deserves special mention. The fear that the
United States would leave gold was equivalent to a fear that the United
States would inflate at a faster rate than the United Kingdom (or deflate
at a slower rate). The fear of inflation also animated the domestic oppo-
nents of free silver. As we pointed out in A Monetary History,
41 the
paradoxical effect was to produce deflation—or more rapid deflation than
would otherwise have occurred. The paradox shows up to the full in
interest rates. Before 1896, prices were falling one percentage point per
year faster in the United States than in the United Kingdom. That alone
should have produced a 1 percent per year appreciation of the United
States dollar and a one percentage point lower interest rate. However,
the fear of inflation more than countered the fact of deflation; it kept the
currency in danger of being devalued; and made interest rates in the
United States one percentage point higher relative to those in the United
Kingdom than they were after the fear was resolved.
The contrast between fact and belief continued after 1896. In the
subsequent eighteen years, prices rose in the United States by roughly
one percentage point more per year than in the United Kingdom. The
fact of inflation by itself should have produced a 1 percent per year
depreciation of the United States dollar and a one percentage point
higher interest rate in the United States. However, the altered attitudes
and the almost complete elimination of the silver issue meant that the
exchange value of the dollar was never threatened and that United States
interest rates, while higher than those in the United Kingdom, were one
percentage point less so than before 1896. Put most simply, the facts of
41. Ibid., p. 132.517 Yields in Subperiods
inflation would have justified a two percentage point rise in the differen-
tial from before to after 1896. The beliefs about inflation produced a one
percentage point decline! We shall revert to this issue later in our discus-
sion of the Gibson paradox.
The two war periods are obviously special. Yet, so far as nominal rates
are concerned, the United States-United Kingdom differentials for the
war periods are intermediate between the preceding and following
periods.
To summarize: We conclude that the decline in the United States-
United Kingdom differential for the nominal short rate from before to
after 1896 reflects the resolution of fears that the United States would
experience inflation and the United States dollar would be devalued; the
further decline from pre-World War I to the interwar period reflects a
decline in the real yield on physical capital in the United States relative to
that in the United Kingdom, and the further decline from the interwar
period to the post-World War II period reflects greater inflation in the
United Kingdom than in the United States and an accompanying depre-
ciation of the pound sterling.
10.4.2 Yields on Nominal and Physical Assets
If arbitrage had worked as well for each subperiod as it did for the
period as a whole, yields on nominal and physical assets would either
have been equal or would have differed by a constant reflecting the
average preference for nominal versus physical assets (or the reverse). As
noted in our earlier comparison between averages for all phases and
averages for all nonwar phases, arbitrage did not work as well for the
subperiods as for the period as a whole. For the two periods of falling
prices, the yield on nominal assets was decidedly higher in both countries
than the yield on physical assets. Deflation was not anticipated. Lenders
did well. Borrowers did poorly. Since entrepreneurs generally borrow in
nominal terms to acquire physical assets, it follows that rentiers did well,
entrepreneurs badly—which is of course conventional (which does not
always mean correct) wisdom, merely another way of expressing the
widely believed generalization that a period of unanticipated deflation is
adverse to enterprise and growth.
With one exception (the United Kingdom after 1896), the relation is
reversed during periods of inflation, including the war periods: the yield
on physical assets was higher than the yield on nominal assets. Appar-
ently inflation too was not anticipated. Entrepreneurs did well, rentiers
did poorly; capital was transferred from savers to borrowers—which is of
course another way of expressing the widely believed generalization that
unanticipated inflation is favorable to enterprise and growth.
As Irving Fisher put this point in 1907: "While imperfection of foresight
transfers wealth from creditor to debtor or the reverse, inequality of518 Money and Interest Rates
foresight produces overinvestment during rising prices and relative
stagnation during falling prices."
4
2
Yet, like many widely believed generalizations, the generalization that
unanticipated inflation is favorable to growth and unanticipated deflation
unfavorable may be an illusion—a money illusion that is part and parcel
of the same phenomenon as the failure to anticipate inflations and defla-
tions. According to table 10.3, in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, real growth (our proxy for the real yield on physical assets) was
greater during the pre-1896 period of falling prices than during the
post-1896 period of rising prices.
4
3 But the public perception at the time
was clearly the reverse. Alfred Marshall referred to the possible contra-
diction between perception and reality in 1886 when he wrote, "I think
there is much less difference than is generally supposed between the net
benefits of periods of rising and falling prices."
4
4
The situation is different for the interwar and postwar periods: real
growth was greater in both countries during the postwar period of rising
prices than during the interwar period of falling prices. However, the
emergence of stagflation in both countries at the end of and following the
period we cover, plus the special role of the Great Depression, suggests
that this is a fragile piece of evidence for the generalization in question.
Table 10.5 brings out more clearly the effect of the rate of change of
prices on the difference between the yields on nominal and physical
assets. It lists the subperiods by the rate of price change, disregarding
both chronology and country—even though, as the preceding section
demonstrates, there are systematic differences between the United States
and the United Kingdom. If the price change had been fully anticipated
and the real yields had been independent of the rate of price change, the
nominal yields on nominal assets in column 2 would rise as we go down
the table, the real yields on nominal assets in column 4 would stay
constant. In fact, the nominal yields in column 2 fluctuate about a roughly
constant level, so that the effect of inflation is reflected primarily in a
sharp decline in the real yield on nominal assets in column 4.
4
5 The
hypothetical pattern of yields for a fully anticipated inflation comes closer
to being realized for physical assets. Their nominal yield rises with
inflation and their real yield fluctuates about a more or less constant level.
However, this pattern does not reflect anticipations so much as the
42. The Rate of Interest, p. 286.
43. We are indebted to Arthur Gandolfi for calling our attention to the contradiction
between our table 10.3 and the common belief.
44. Alfred Marshall, Official Papers (London: Macmillan, 1926), p. 9.
45. Note that the pre-1896 nominal yield is the most out of line, and that this is the yield
that we decided in the preceding section was held up by fears of inflation despite the fact of
deflation. Lowering this yield by one to three percentage points would produce a tendency
for the nominal yield for peacetime periods to rise slightly along with the rate of inflation.?s
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physical character of the assets and the real character of the yields. For
nominal assets, investors fix rates in nominal terms and contract for a
period ahead: prescience is therefore required if these rates are to reflect
future price behavior. For physical assets, investors may fix no rates—
certainly not in nominal terms—and generally make no contracts about
either real or nominal yields for a period ahead. The yield is generated
out of the economic activity in which the asset is employed. It requires no
prescience for the nominal yield on physical assets to reflect current price
behavior, only that the physical assets participate along with other assets
in the nominal income and spending flows.
Column 6 gives the excess of the yield on physical assets over that on
nominal assets. It is negative for deflation, positive for inflation. This
pattern comes out clearly in chart 10-14, which plots the excess yield on
physical assets against the rate of price change. If inflations were fully
anticipated, the difference between yields on physical and nominal assets
might be expected to be roughly a constant, reflecting any preference
among asset holders for one category or the other of assets. Clearly the
points are very far from clustering around such a horizontal line. If
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Chart 10.14 Excess of yield on physical over yield on nominal assets versus
rate of change of prices.
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one or the other category of assets, the points would fall along the dashed
forty-five-degree line, since, ex post, the nominal yield on physical assets
would reflect the actual rate of inflation, whereas the ex-ante nominal
yield on nominal assets would not. In fact the points come rather close to
approximating a line with a forty-five-degree slope but displaced down-
ward by about one percentage point, as is indicated by the two regression
lines, implying a preference of that amount for physical over nominal
assets, that is, a willingness to accept that much less in yield in order to
hold a physical rather than a nominal asset.
4
6
Chart 10-14 diverges appreciably from the pattern that would be pro-
duced by wholly unanticipated inflations only with respect to the points
for the final three wartime episodes in table 10.5: both United States
wartime episodes and, especially, World War I for the United Kingdom.
These lie roughly on a horizontal line, as if they corresponded to antici-
pated inflations. But interpreting them this way implies a very great
preference (about eight percentage points) for nominal assets during
wartime periods over physical assets—which seems most implausible. We
are inclined therefore to treat the United Kingdom World War I point as
an aberration—perhaps statistical, perhaps economic—rather than as an
indication of correct anticipation of wartime inflation.
4
7
The generalization that these results suggest is that, for the period our
data cover, there was a preference of about 1.25 percentage points for
physical over nominal assets and both inflation and deflation were wholly
unanticipated—which, combined with risk aversion, would justify the
preference for physical assets as reflecting a desire to hedge real returns
against both unanticipated inflation and unanticipated deflation.
These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the ex-ante
nominal yields on nominal assets incorporate correctly anticipated rates
of inflation—which merely confirms what has long been known, that the
public has not in fact been able to form correct anticipations of inflation—
at least, until possibly very recently (see section 10.8). They give little
evidence on a more interesting proposition: Is there within the periods a
gradual recognition of and adjustment to inflation or deflation of the kind
that was postulated by Irving Fisher? To answer that question, we need to
46. The simple correlation for the points in chart 10.14 is .89, and the regression
equations calculated both ways are
Differential yield = -.84 + .80 g^.,4
= -1.54 + 1.01 gP.A .
Note that the second equation is obtained simply by solving the regression of gP.A on the
differential yield for the differential yield.
47. Excluding this point, the correlation is .93 and the two regressions are:
Differential yield = -1.22 + 1.09 gP.A
= -1.62 + 1.27 gP.A .522 Money and Interest Rates
go beyond the subperiod averages and look at the observations within the
periods.
10.5 Relation between Yields on
Nominal and Physical Assets
Our proxy for the real return on physical assets was far from being the
same in the various periods, ranging for the six periods for the United
States from 1.9 to 3.6 and for the United Kingdom from - 2.6 to 2.2. Yet
these yields varied far less than the ex-post real yield on nominal assets,
which ranged from - 4.7 to 6.8 for the United States and from -10.8 to
4.8 for the United Kingdom. Moreover, one extreme item accounts for
most of the range for the United Kingdom for the real return on physical
assets. Omitting World War I which, as we have seen, appears to be an
aberration, leaves five observations ranging from 1.3 to 2.2. No remotely
comparable reduction in the range can be achieved for the real yield on
nominal assets for either the United States or the United Kingdom by
omitting the most discrepant observation.
These results suggest that it may not be a bad first approximation—for
the purpose of studying monetary influences on interest rates—to follow
Irving Fisher and assume that the ex-post real return on physical assets
can be taken to be roughly constant on the average over time—though at
a higher level in the United States than in the United Kingdom—and to
accept our proxy as a reasonably accurate measure of that real return.
On these lines, the wide variation among subperiods in the difference
between returns on nominal and physical assets reflects primarily the
failure of nominal yields on nominal assets to adjust to the actual rate of
inflation. As a result, ex-post real returns on nominal assets vary widely.
The implication of rough constancy of real returns on physical assets is
that the variation in ex-post real returns on nominal assets reflects pri-
marily unanticipated changes in inflation.
4
8
48. As Fisher says in his chapter "Inductive Verification (Monetary)" in The Rate of
Interest, "In general the latter factor—unforseen monetary change—is the more important
[compared with factors affecting the real rate on physical assets]. . . . It is, of course, not to
be assumed that commodity-interest [the real yield] ought to be absolutely invariable; but it
is practically certain that its variations would not be three and a half times the variations in
money-interest, unless the price movements were inadequately predicted" (pp. 27^-80).
In the chapter in his later book, The Theory of Interest, in which he presents his statistical
calculations relating interest rates to past price change, Fisher does not explicitly discuss the
constancy or variability of the real return on physical assets until the final two sentences of
the chapter. He writes, "while the main object of this book is to show how the rate of interest
would behave if the purchasing power of money were stable, there has never been any long
period of time during which this condition has been even approximately fulfilled. When it is
not fulfilled, the money rate of interest, and even more the real rate of interest [i.e., the
ex-post real return on nominal assets] is more affected by the instability of money than by523 Relations between Yields on Nominal and Physical Assets
Suppose now that the nominal yields do not adjust to the actual rate of
inflation, but along Fisher's lines do adjust to the anticipated rate of
inflation, which in turn adjusts to actual inflation after a considerable lag.
We would then expect to find that shortly after a change from, say, falling
to rising prices, the yield on physical assets would exceed considerably
the yield on nominal assets, reflecting the incorporation in the yield on
nominal assets of the lagged anticipations of falling prices. As prices
continued to rise, the differential would decline and approach the equilib-
rium difference reflecting (inversely) any general preference for physical
over nominal assets (or the converse).
On this interpretation, real yields on nominal assets would be highly
variable within the subperiods, but real yields on physical assets would be
relatively stable. The standard deviations of ex-post real returns in table
10.1 for the period as a whole show such a difference. However, those for
nonwar phases alone do not for the United States and table 10.3 demon-
strates that, for both the United States and the United Kingdom, the
higher variability of ex-post real returns on nominal assets reflects largely
differences between periods, not within periods. For five out of six
within-period comparisons for the United States and three out of six for
the United Kingdom, the ex-post real yield on physical assets is more
variable than the ex-post real yield on nominal assets. Clearly, there is no
systematic tendency the other way.
Chart 10.15 permits a more detailed examination of the intraperiod
relation. It plots for each phase the excess of the return on physical assets
over the return on nominal assets—which we shall refer to for brevity as
the "differential"—against the rate of change of prices. The vertical lines
separate the subperiods distinguished in table 10.3.
For both countries, the positive correlation between the differential
and the rate of price change that we found to hold between periods clearly
is present also within periods, though somewhat less consistently. Again,
the correlation reflects the failure of yields on nominal assets to be
adjusted promptly or at all to the actual course of prices.
For the United States, for the two prewar periods, there is a very clear
and distinct shift in the rate of price change from a rate of decline of about
2 percent per year to a rate of rise of about 2 percent (see table 10.5, col.
1), so this pair of periods seems almost ideal for examining the effect of a
shift from reasonably steadily falling prices to reasonably steadily rising
those more fundamental and more normal causes connected with income impatience, and
opportunity, to which this book is chiefly devoted" (p. 451).
In the earlier part of the chapter, the assumption of a fixed real return on physical assets is




























































































6526 Money and Interest Rates
prices. However, we have already seen that this appearance is deceiving:
the first period was one in which inflation was anticipated, even though
deflation was experienced. Hence, the lower differential in the first
period than in the second is consistent with the adjustment of the dif-
ferential to the anticipated movement in prices, though the magnitude of
the difference between the two periods (3.86 percentage points; see table
10.5, col. 6) is larger than can readily be accounted for in this way. With
respect to movements within the periods, the differential shows no
tendency to rise in the first period as would be expected from a gradual
adjustment of anticipations. However, as chart 10.16 shows, the nominal
rate on nominal assets does decline during the period. The failure of the
differential to decline reflects the decline also in the nominal yield on
physical assets. In the second period, the differential starts out sizably
positive and then does decline, fluctuating around zero. This second
period, therefore, conforms in part to the pattern for the differential
sketched earlier. However, a closer examination indicates that this con-
formity, like the nonconformity for the first period, is partly spurious. As
chart 10.16 shows, the decline in the differential in the second period is
produced mostly by a decline in the yield on physical assets (both nominal
and real), rather than by a rise in the yield on nominal assets, though the
latter does rise mildly. These intraperiod patterns are therefore only very
loosely consistent with a gradual adjustment of nominal rates to incorpo-
rate inflationary expectations.
The United Kingdom data for the pre-World War I period plotted in
panel B of chart 10.15 do not show any clearer evidence of the Fisherian
pattern than the United States data. The differential in the main fluctu-
ates about a roughly constant level. That level shows at the most a very
mild rise during the first period of falling prices but no decline during the
later period of rising prices. However, the nominal short-term yield does
fall mildly during the first period as if it were adjusting to expectations of
deflation and rise mildly during the second as if it were adjusting to
expectations of inflation. The United Kingdom was, of course, at the time
a much more sophisticated financial market than the United States, so it
might have been expected to conform to the Fisherian pattern more
closely than the United States. In fact, any difference in this respect is
trivial.
For World War I, for both the United States and the United Kingdom,
the differential primarily mirrors price changes: nominal yields rose only
slightly along with inflation, while our proxy for nominal yields on physi-
cal assets reflected the inflation—fully for the United States, largely for
the United Kingdom. Clearly, no Fisherian pattern is evident here—nor
should it be, given the widespread recognition that war is after all special
and not to be extrapolated, plus the extensive government intervention
into the financial system.527 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and Rates of Change of Prices
For the interwar period, for both the United States and the United
Kingdom, there is some minor evidence of the Fisherian pattern. Nomi-
nal yields fall sharply toward the end of the period, the lowest level being
reached after the rate of price change has shifted from negative to
positive. The adjustment is sizable in terms of the usual variation in
short-term rates but mild compared to the drastic changes in the rate of
price change. On the other hand, yields on physical assets fully reflect the
change in the rate of price change. As a result, the differential largely
mirrors, as during the two wars, price changes. The low level of short-
term yields in the succeeding period that we have designated as in World
War II, though it begins in 1937, may partly reflect the Fisherian process.
However, that lower level owes as much to government controls as to the
incorporation of deflationary expectations in the low short-term yields
during the highly inflationary war.
The post-World War II period shows the clearest evidence of the
Fisherian pattern. For both the United States and the United Kingdom,
the differential falls during most of the postwar period of rising prices,
though not continuously so. More important, the differential is mostly
inversely rather than positively related to the rate of price change, the
nominal short-term yield is as variable as our proxy for the nominal yield
on physical assets, the nominal short-term yield rises steadily throughout
the period, the ex-post real yield on nominal assets rises sharply in the
early part of the period and then fluctuates about a more or less constant
level, and our proxy for the real yield on physical assets shows no steady
trend.
All in all, this detailed examination of the intraperiod movements of
yields supports the Fisherian interpretation at most for the post-World
War II period.
10.6 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and
Rates of Change of Prices
The inconclusive results of the preceding section suggest examining
more closely the relation between nominal yields and both the level of
prices and the rate of change of prices.
On theoretical grounds, there is no reason to expect any direct relation
between the nominal rate of interest and the level of prices. The rate of
interest is a pure number except for its temporal dimension: dollars per
dollars per year. The level of prices is not a pure number; it has the
dimensions of dollars. There is a strictly arbitrary element in the price
level related to the monetary unit. Clearly, if prices double because of a
change in the unit—as happened, for example, in Rhodesia when it
shifted in 1965 from the British pound as its currency to the RhodesianI I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I ICO
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dollar at an initial exchange rate of $2 to the pound—there is no reason
for any interest rate to be affected. If prices double, not because of a
change in units, but because of a doubling of the amount of money per
unit of output as a result, say, of war finance, there is again no reason to
expect the rate of interest to change on this score once the country has
adjusted to the new situation.
Dimensionally, the rate of change of prices, not the level of prices, is
comparable to the interest rate. It too is dollars per dollar per unit of time
and has the dimension of the reciprocal of time. And, as Fisher pointed
out, theoretical considerations suggest that the nominal interest rate
should be related to the rate of change of prices—either actual or antici-
pated.
Yet, empirically, the "tendency of prices and interest rates to rise
together . . . and to fall together" was described by J. M. Keynes in 1930
as "one of the most completely established empirical facts within the
whole field of quantitative economics." He termed it the "Gibson para-
dox," after a British financial journalist, A. H. Gibson, and this name has
stuck despite the fact that the phenomenon had been described and
analyzed three decades earlier by Knut Wicksell.
4
9
Keynes's unqualified and colorful assertion helped to render the Gib-
son paradox a largely unchallenged generalization despite Macaulay's
subsequent conclusion, in the course of one of the most perceptive
examinations of the paradox that has yet been published, that while "it is
true that, in various countries and often for long periods of time, the
movements of interest rates (or rather bond yields) and commodity prices
have been such as to suggest that they might be rationally related to one
another in some direct and simple manner . . . the exceptions to this




We now have data for nearly five decades more than were available to
Keynes and nearly four decades more than were available to Macaulay,
so it will be well to reexamine how well and with what exceptions
Keynes's empirical assertion holds.
49. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, vol. 2 (1930), ed. Royal Economic Society
(London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 177-86. Keynes's failure to refer to Wicksell in connection
with the Gibson paradox is curious, since in volume 1 of the Treatise he discusses Wicksell's
work and refers to Wicksell's analysis as largely coinciding with his own and as deserving
"more fame and much more attention than it has received from English-speaking econo-
mists" (Treatise, 1: 167). Wicksell discussed in English what Keynes called the Gibson
paradox in his article "The Influence of the Rate of Interest on Prices," Economic Journal
17 (June 1907): 213-20.
50. Frederick R. Macaulay, The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock
Prices in the United States Since 1856 (New York: NBER, 1938), p. 185. See also his implicit
criticism of Keynes's "adjustments" to the data, pp. 163-64.531 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and Rates of Change of Prices
Chart 10.17 plots phase averages of the short-term nominal rate and of
the rate of price change. For the United States, these more detailed data,
like the earlier analysis simply in terms of periods of rising and falling
prices, show only the loosest relation. Before 1950 there are occasional
coincidences, such as the 1896 dip in both commercial paper rates and
price change, or lagged relations, such as the World War I price explosion
and the subsequent peak in commercial paper rates. But these are more
plausibly interpreted in terms of specific historical circumstances than as a
Fisherian allowance for anticipated inflation. The first coincidence is very
likely the common result of the measures taken to end the threat to the
gold standard. The 1921 peak in interest rates is related to the price
inflation, not through allowance for anticipated inflation but through
monetary policy. The sharp contractionary monetary measures taken by
the Federal Reserve to end the postwar inflationary boom had an initial
liquidity effect that drove up short-term rates.
The interesting feature of the United States chart is the striking con-
trast between the period before and after 1950. For the post-World War
II phases there is a close correlation between the rate of interest and the
rate of price change.
Fot the United Kingdom, panel B of chart 10.17 again confirms the
earlier judgments. Before the early 1950's there is little relation. After
World War II, except only for the first two phases, there is a close
correlation.
One feature common to both countries is the much wider variability in
the rate of price change than in the rate of interest, except for the one
post-World War II period. The wider variability in the rate of price
change may be simply a statistical artifact, reflecting greater measure-
ment error in the series on price change than in the series on interest
rates. A more plausible explanation is economic: before World War II,
the wider variability of prices reflects the existence of monetary and other
disturbances that were stochastic and could not readily be anticipated.
After World War II, variability was large but was attributable to policy,
not chance. We shall return to this line of reasoning later.
First, however, let us examine the relation between the short-term rate
and the price level. These series are plotted in chart 10.18. The difference
in dimensionality makes the association of scales for the two series
arbitrary. We have resolved this arbitrariness for the basic price scale by
locating it so as to put the mean price level for the pre-World War I
period on the same point on the ordinate as the mean interest rate for that
period. The interval on the logarithmic price scale was chosen so as to
yield about the same amplitude for prices in that period as the arithmetic
scale for interest rates yields for interest rates.
The continuous series plotted for a century resolve a major part of the
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Chart 10.18 Short-term nominal interest rate and price level, 1870-1975.
do not follow major changes in price level. The theoretical expectation
that jumps in the level of prices should leave no imprint on the rate of
interest is fully confirmed. For both countries, the jumps in prices during
World Wars I and II are not matched by any corresponding jump in
interest rates. That much, at least, is eminently clear.535 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and Rates of Change of Prices
On the other hand, the close relation between interest rates and the
level of prices during the pre-World War I period is striking, the only
significant deviations being for the United States in the early years, when
interest rates are out of line on the high side, and the final few years, when
they are out of line on the low side.
To bring out any similar relation for the interwar and postwar periods,
we have replotted the segment of the price series for those periods,
shifting the origin of the vertical scale so as to make the average price
level for each period coincide with the average rate of interest. For both
the United States and the United Kingdom there is a definite correlation
for both periods but a less close correlation than for the pre-World War I
period, and for the post-World War II period it is not clear that the
relation reflects more than common trends. Furthermore, for both coun-
tries, but more clearly for the United States, there seems to be a distinct
break for the period after 1960 corresponding to the break we found
earlier in the relation between the interest rate and the rate of price
change. When interest rates start to parallel price changes, they start
departing from parallelism with the price level.
The contrast between the relation of the interest rate to the rate of
price change and the price level, as well as between the intraperiod and
long-period relations, is brought out clearly in table 10.6. The only
significant correlations for individual periods between interest rates and
the rate of price change are for the post-World War II period. On the
other hand, all the correlations for the three nonwar individual periods
between the interest rate and the level of prices are positive and statisti-
cally significant.
For the period as a whole, none of the United States correlations with
the rate of price change or the price level is statistically significant, either
including or excluding wars. Three of the four United Kingdom correla-
tions are significantly positive, both of those for the price level, and the
correlation for nonwar phases for the rate of change of prices.
A more detailed description of the Gibson relation for nonwar periods
is given in table 10.7. For both the United States and the United King-
dom, the intercepts clearly differ significantly between the periods—as
was abundantly clear from chart 10.18. As is obvious from that chart, the
slopes differ significantly for the United States, not for the United
Kingdom.
5
1 One remarkable point brought out by the table and not by the
charts is the close similarity between the countries. The average slopes
for the three periods are almost identical, once allowance is made for
differences in intercepts (compare lines 9 and 10); when a single slope is
used for the three periods, the intercepts for the United States exceed
51. Herewith a summary analysis of variance (table 10.N.I, following page). Note that
the F value for the United States corresponding to the 2 degrees of freedom for the three























































































































* Significantly different from zero at .05 level.
**Significantly different from zero at .01 level.
those for the United Kingdom by 2.68,1.38, and 1.44 percentage points
for the three successive periods. More surprising perhaps is the closeness
of the residual standard error of estimate, both when a single slope is used
(0.0075 versus 0.0081), and when separate slopes are (0.0056 versus
0.0083). This similarity, like the corresponding examples in earlier chap-
ters, is further evidence of how integrated the United States and United
Kingdom economies have been. It cannot be taken as further evidence
for the reality of the Gibson phenomenon. It is simply a reflection of the
tendency for price levels and interest rates in the two countries to move
together, though not identically.
The Gibson paradox remains, but cut down to much more manageable
size and stripped of its greatest element of mystery.
5
2
52. Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., "An Explanation of the Gibson Paradox," Ph.D. diss.,
University of Chicago, 1979, explores the relation between interest rates and prices for538 Money and Interest Rates



















































































Note: Interest rates expressed as decimal (e.g., 5 percent is .05). Price level expressed as
ratio to 1929 level (e.g., 1929 = 1.0).
The indication that there may have been a structural change in the
relation between interest rates and prices in the post-World War II
period is so intriguing that it seems worth exploring this point in more
detail by exploiting data for time units shorter than phases. As it happens,
monthly data are available from 1913 for the United States and 1915 for
the United Kingdom on both consumer prices and interest rates. As
background, chart 10.19 duplicates chart 10.17 except that it uses the
consumer price index, rather than the price index implicit in the national
income estimates, and monthly data, with the rate of price change aver-




France, Belgium, and Germany, as well as the United States and the United Kingdom. His
conclusion parallels ours: "There is no stable relationship between interest rates and prices"
(p. 79). He finds periods of positive correlation for the United Kingdom and the United
States, especially before 1914 and after World War II, but not for the other countries.
53. It is unclear how best to date the price series matched with the interest rate series. The
interest rate recorded for the month of January, for example, refers to a contract that will539 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and Rates of Change of Prices
The monthly series plotted in chart 10.19 bring out more clearly than
our phase averages two respects in which the post-World War II period—
or much of it—differs from the earlier period: the first starting in the early
or mid-1950s, the second, somewhat later.
The first respect is the drastic decline in the variability of the recorded
price series after the mid-1950s in both countries. Before that period the
rate of price change is many times more variable than the interest rate;
after that date it is still more variable, particularly in the United King-
dom, but the difference is much less. The change in the variability of the
price series may be simply a statistical artifact. In both countries the
reduction in variability coincides with a comprehensive statistical revision
in the price index—in 1953 in the United States, in 1956 in the United
Kingdom.
5
4 It may be that the recorded fluctuations in prices before these
dates reflected largely measurement error.
5
5
terminate some months later (for the United States, sixty to ninety days later through 1923,
four to six months later thereafter; for the United Kingdom, three months later). The
realized real return will depend on what happens to prices in the subsequent period. For that
purpose, the January interest rate should be matched with a rate of price change corre-
sponding to the period from January to the termination month. On the other hand, at the
time the contract is entered into, data are available only on prices up to that point. To relate
the January interest rate only to information available at the time requires using a rate of
price change for a period terminating in January. Given that we are using a rate of price
change based on a six-month interval, that means matching the January interest rate with
the rate of price change from prices in the prior July to January, or a rate centered on
October. That is what we have done in chart 10.19.
Note that in relating the January interest rate "only to information available at the time"
we distinguish between two concepts of information: personal observation over time based
on efficient knowledge of the market versus the official statistics of prices released in
February for the month of January. Neither concept is right, but we judge the historical one
to be better than the official release.
Correlation experiments relating interest rates to price changes subsequently to the date
of the interest rate produced no persuasive evidence to justify a different dating.
54. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Methods of Surveys and Studies, Bulletin no. 1458, October 1966, chap. 10, on consumer
prices, pp. 69-90, for a description of the comprehensive revision of the index in January
1953.
The United Kingdom retail price index was introduced in 1956 as the successor to the cost
of living index, the first officially published index of this sort, which started in 1915. The cost
of living index was designed to show the effect of price changes on the basic goods consumed
by working-class families before August 1914. The retail price index measures changes in
prices of a much more comprehensive basket of goods and services reflecting the average
spending pattern of the great majority of households, including those of practically all wage
earners and most salary earners. See Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Method of
Construction and Calculation of the Index of Retail Prices, Studies in Official Statistics, no. 6
(London: HMSO, 1964).
55. In a private communication before his death, Julius Shiskin noted that, for a period of
six months after the 1953 revision, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics continued
the old series, using the same samples, weights, and procedures in existence before the
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The second respect is the changed relation between the interest rate
and the rate of price change. Up to the 1950s at least, there is only the
vaguest of hints of any systematic short-term relation in either country
between the interest rate and the recorded rate of price change—every
once in a while there is a movement in the interest rate that can be
connected to a movement in the same direction in the price-change
series, but most of the time the two series seem to move independently of
one another. This lack of relationship may be a consequence of the large
measurement error in the rate of price change—the statistical noise in the
recorded price series may have drowned out a systematic relation be-
tween interest rates and the "true" rate of price change.
However, the subsequent behavior of the series, particularly in the
United States, suggests that statistical noise is at best a partial explana-
tion. For some five to ten years in the United States after the 1953
statistical revision, there is no closer relation between the interest rate
and the price series than there was earlier. Then the relation becomes
closer and closer, at first in the general movement, then even in the minor
ups and downs. The change is gradual so that there is no sharp dividing
line, yet after, say, 1965 the relation is clearly very close.
The United Kingdom picture is less clear-cut, partly because the rate of
price change retains more variability after the statistical revision, partly
because the relation never gets as close as in the United States, partly
because of the final spike in the rate of price change unmatched by any
movement in the interest rate—a spike that may be connected with
changes in price control. Statutory price controls were in effect from
November 1972 to February 1974, followed by voluntary controls for the
next six months and then by the reimposition of compulsory controls a
year later, in August 1975. Nonetheless, with the benefit of the hindsight
provided by the United States experience, a very similar pattern can be
seen in the United Kingdom data, with 1965 again a convenient dividing
line.
The looser relation between the two series for the United Kingdom
than for the United States may well reflect statistical defects in both
series: for the rate of price change, the more important and frequent use
of price controls than in the United States; for the interest rate, its
administered character. It is clear from the charts that the rate on bank
bills in the United Kingdom is a managed rate, remaining constant for
however, informs us that he doubts that the decline in variability after 1953 is due to
improvement in the United States consumer price index. He bases his judgment on a study
of wholesale prices, in which he examined some components of the wholesale price index in
the 1920s and post-World War II years and found a considerable decline in the dispersion of
price changes for cycles of roughly the same severity. He attributes the decline to changed
market behavior or a changed composition of markets and products ("Changes in the
Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices in the 1920s and Post-World War II," Explorations
in Economic Research 2 [winter, 1975]: 54-104).543 Nominal Yields, Price Levels, and Rates of Change of Prices




Chart 10.20 provides a closer look at the relation between the interest
rate and the rate of price change for the period after 1965 ending in 1979,
rather than 1975, the final cyclical turning point of our trend period. It
differs from Chart 10.19 both in an enlarged time scale and in a different
time reference of the rate of price change. Chart 10.19 plotted the price
change retrospectively; that is, the price change associated with, say, a
January interest rate is the change during the prior six months, or the
information that could have been available to the lenders and borrowers
when they entered into their contract. Chart 10.20 plots the price change
prospectively; that is, the price change associated with, say, a January
interest rate, is the change that is estimated to occur during the period of
the loan contract. Hence the vertical difference is the realized real rate of
return, and the price change is the one that the transactors would, if they
had perfect foresight, take into account.
5
7
For the United States the relation is very close indeed throughout the
period. The shifting of dates does not improve the relation as judged by
simple correlations, though visually it appears to do so at a number of
points.
5
8 These results leave very much open the question whether partici-
56. John Foster, "Interest Rates and Inflation Expectations: The British Experience,"
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41 (May 1979): 145-64, comments (p. 152, n.
24): "It is worth emphasizing that short-term securities in the United Kingdom differ from
those in the United States in that the latter are generally viewed as market determined
whereas the former have been administered through Bank Rate policy and, more recently,
through alterations in the Minimum Lending Rate [introduced in 1972]."
57. The actual matching is approximate. For the United States, we treated the four-to-six
month commercial paper rate as if it always referred to six-month paper, which makes the
six-month price change the relevant change, and gives the simple dating of matching the
January interest rate (which for six-month paper refers to a contract terminating in July)
with the January to July rate of price change.
For the United Kingdom, the interest rate is for a three-month bill, and the correct
matching would be with a three-month price change. However, both for consistency with
the United States and to reduce variability, we decided to retain a six-month price change
and simply match as closely as possible the central dates of the interest rate contract and the
price change. A January interest rate refers to a contract terminating in April; its central
date is midway between February and March. The price change from November to May is
centered in February, the price change from December to June, in March, so either one
differs in dating by one-half month. We arbitrarily chose to match the December to June
price change with the January interest rate.
58. Herewith the simple correlation coefficients for 1965-79:

































U546 Money and Interest Rates
pants in the market can successfully predict the movement of prices for a
few months ahead.
For the United Kingdom the relation is far looser. As we noted earlier,
this difference may reflect the statistical defects of the United Kingdom
series rather than a basic economic difference between the two countries.
10.7 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
The preceding sections narrow more than has hitherto been done the
Gibson phenomenon to be explained: first, the alleged relation does not
hold over periods witnessing a substantial shift in the price level, but only
within briefer periods; second, the markets may have learned their Fisher
and so have made Gibson obsolete. But this narrowing of the paradox
does not eliminate it; it still represents a striking empirical regularity in
search of an explanation.
The most famous and most fully explored explanations that have been
proposed are the monetary explanation suggested by Irving Fisher and
the real explanation suggested first by Knut Wicksell and later by J. M.
Keynes.
10.7.1 The Fisher Explanation
As already noted, Fisher's proposed explanation hinges on a lag be-
tween a change in the direction of price movements and the public's
perception of that change. In his 1907 Rate of Interest, which largely
overlaps his 1896 Appreciation and Interest, he expresses this explanation
in very general terms:
Three general facts have now been established: (1) Rising and falling
prices and wages are directly correlated with high and low rates of
interest; (2) The adjustment of interest to price-movements is inade-
quate; (3) This adjustment is more nearly adequate for long than for
short periods.
These facts are capable of a common explanation expressing the
manner in which the adjustment referred to takes place. Suppose an
upward movement of prices begins. Business profits (measured in
money) will rise.. .. Borrowers can now afford to pay higher "money-
interest." If, however, only a few persons at first see this, the interest
will not be fully adjusted, and borrowers will realize an extra margin of
profit after deducting interest charges. This raises an expectation of a
similar profit in the future and this expectation, acting on the demand
for loans, will raise the rate of interest. If the rise is still inadequate, the
process is repeated, and thus by continual trial and error the rate
approaches the true adjustment. . . .
Since at the beginning of an upward price-movement the rate of
interest is too low, and at the beginning of a downward movement it is
too high, we can understand not only that the averages for the whole547 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
periods are imperfectly adjusted, but that the delay in the adjustment
leaves a relatively low interest at the beginning of an ascent of prices,
and a relatively high interest at the beginning of a descent. And this is
what we found to be true. That the adjustment is more perfect for long
periods than for short periods seems to be because, in short periods,
the years of non-adjustment at the beginning occupy a larger relative
part of the whole period.
5
9
When Fisher returned to the problem some two decades later, he
converted this general hypothesis into a much more rigid and formal
one—and one, incidentally, with less economics. In the interim he had
developed distributed lags, and he applied them to this problem. He
expressed the nominal interest rate as the sum of a real interest rate,
implicitly assumed constant, and an anticipated rate of price change, and
then approximated the anticipated rate of price change by a weighted
average of prior price change, with the weights declining linearly and
summing to unity—that is, a triangular weighting pattern.
6
0 Whereas in
1907 he had explained the changes in interest rates as produced by shifts
in the demand for loans arising from the result of unanticipated inflation
on profits, a process that requires no explicit formation of inflationary
anticipations, here the anticipations take center stage.
For the delayed formation of anticipations to explain Gibson's paradox
empirically, the time it takes people to form their anticipations must have
a particular relation to the duration of the long swing in prices. If people
formed their anticipations very rapidly—much more rapidly than the
duration of a price rise or a price fall—interest rates would rise only
briefly when prices started to rise and soon would be high but constant;
and similarly when prices started to fall. Interest rates would look more
like the steps in chart 10.10 than like the wavy dotted line. A close
correlation between rising prices and rising rates requires that the time it
takes for people to adjust their anticipations must be roughly comparable
to the duration of the long swings in prices. It is not surprising, therefore,
that when Fisher estimated the lag in forming anticipations by using
observed interest rates and prices he found that the average period of the
distributed lag of anticipations behind prices was 7.3 years (i.e., triangu-
lar weights covering twenty years) for United States long rates computed
from annual data from 1900 to 1927; 10.7 years (i.e., triangular weights
covering thirty years) for United States short rates computed from
quarterly data from 1915 to 1927; 10.0 years (triangular weights covering
twenty-eight years) for United Kingdom long rates computed from
annual data from 1898 to 1924.
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59. The Rate of Interest, pp. 284-85.
60. Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 407-44.
61. Ibid., pp. 421, 422, 427. The mean period of continuous triangular weights is
one-third the total period of the weights. For discontinuous weights, for which the initial548 Money and Interest Rates
Frederick Macaulay, in his 1938 book, was highly critical of Fisher's
analysis, partly on purely statistical grounds. He pointed out serious
errors in Fisher's appendix tables, correction of which substantially re-
duced the already low correlation between levels of interest rates and the
rate of change of prices. He noted that "rates and yields were usually
more highly correlated with 'the weighted average of sundry successive'
price changes than they were with the individual price changes; but not so
highly correlated as they were with the raw prices."
62 He then pointed out,
as did others many years later when there was a resumption of interest in
the subject, that "as the number of [past rates of change of prices]
included in the [triangularly weighted average of price change] is in-
creased, the configuration of [the weighted average] usually approxi-
mates more and more closely the configuration of [the price level]."
6
3 In
consequence, he argued that Fisher's correlations were only a disguised
reflection of the Gibson phenomenon, not an explanation thereof. He
stressed also the difference in results for different periods, a point to
which we shall recur. Macaulay admitted the existence of a real puzzle
but believed that Fisher had not provided a satisfactory resolution.
In recent years a number of scholars have repeated and extended
Fisher's calculations, with only slight modifications. The results have
been highly consistent. For periods including World War I or World War
II and some ways beyond, the results reproduce Fisher's finding that long
lags yield the highest correlations.
6
4 However, for recent years that is not
the case. Yohe and Karnosky and Robert Gordon find that, for the later
years of the postwar period, a shorter weighted average of past price




This finding, plus the understandable skepticism about the plausibility
of such long lags that has all along hindered the acceptance of Fisher's
conclusions, stimulated efforts to find other tests of Fisher's hypothesis.
For the period since 1947, an independent series of price forecasts for the
weight is taken as dated minus one time unit, the mean period is one-third the total period
plus either two-thirds or one-third of a time unit, depending on whether a total period of T
units is interpreted as corresponding to discontinuous weights 1, 2, . . . , T, or to discon-
tinuous weights 0, 1, 2, . . . , T— 1. Fisher is inconsistent in converting total periods into
mean periods. He sometimes converts by dividing by three, sometimes by dividing by three
and adding two-thirds. We have used means obtained by dividing by three and adding
two-thirds, since this corresponds to a change that Fisher made in listing errata for page 423.
62. Macaulay, Movements of Interest Rates, p. 171 (italics in original).
63. Ibid., p. 174.
64. See Suraj Gupta, "Expected Rates of Change in Prices and Rates of Interest," Ph.D.
diss., University of Chicago, 1964.
65. W. P. Yohe and D. S. Karnosky, "Interest Rates and Price Level Changes" (note 3,
above); Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, no. 1, (1971), pp. 145-48.549 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
United States has been compiled by Joseph Livingston from responses by
a panel of business economists. Several studies have correlated this series
with interest rates and used it to test hypotheses about the formation of
expectations. The major findings relevant to our present purpose are that
expectations are highly correlated with interest rates but that a short
rather than a long weighted average of past price behavior gives the best
fit to inflation forecasts.
6
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66. John A. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts," Annals of Economic and Social
Measurement 6, no. 1 (1977): 27-56, contains the most thorough description and presenta-
tion of these data that we have seen.
For analyses of these data see William E. Gibson, "Interest Rates and Inflationary
Expectations"; Kajal Lahiri, "Inflationary Expectations: Their Formation and Interest
Rate Effects," American Economic Review 66 (March 1976): 124-31; James E. Pesando,
"A Note on the Rationality of the Livingston Price Expectations," Journal of Political
Economy 83 (August 1975): 849-58; David H. Pyle, "Observed Price Expectations and
Interest Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (August 1972): 275-81; Stephen J.
Turnovsky, "Some Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price Expectations," Journal
ofthe American Statistical Association 65 (December 1970): 1441-54; Stephen J. Turnovsky
and Michael L. Wachter, "A Test of the 'Expectations Hypothesis' Using Directly
Observed Wage and Price Expectations," Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (February
1972): 47-54; Lahiri and Lee, "Tests of Rational Expectations."
Gibson does not test the relation between the Livingston expectations and prior price
behavior but solely between them and interest rates, finding a good correlation, but
suggesting that there is evidence of a break in the relation around 1965. Turnovsky is more
directly concerned with expectations formation. He too finds a break in the data during the
early 1960s and finds a good relation between the expectations and prior price behavior only
after the early 1960s. A similar finding is reported in A. B. Holmes and M. L. Kwast,
"Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: Tests for Structural Changes, 1952-1976,"
Journal of Finance 34 (June 1979): 733-41.
Quarterly interpolations of the Livingston expectations series and also of a series based
on Survey Research Center surveys have been published by F. Juster and P. Wachtel,
"Inflation and the Consumer," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1972), pp.
71-114. These series were updated in P. Wachtel, "Survey Measures of Expected Inflation
and Their Potential Usefulness," Analysis of Inflation, 1965-1974, ed. Joel Popkin, Studies
in Income and Wealth, vol. 42 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), pp. 361-94. G. de
Menil and S. S. Bhalla, "Direct Measurement of Popular Price Expectations," American
Economic Review 65 (March 1975): 169-80, used the Survey Research Center series to
explain wage changes. S. J. Feldman has used both expectations series to examine their
relation to interest rates from 1955 to 1971 and to various weighted averages of past price
changes. He concludes, as did Gibson, that there is a close relation between price expecta-
tions and interest rates but finds no evidence of any change in the relation. Like Turnovsky,
he does find a break in the 1960s in the relation between directly observed price expectations
and the weighted averages of past price changes. He concludes that "distributed lag
hypotheses are poor proxies for anticipated inflation" and that "how the market forecasted
inflation has altered." "The Formation of Price Expectations and the Nominal Rate of
Interest: Is Fisher Right?" unpublished Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research
Paper no. 7416, July 1974.
Cukierman and Wachtel relate the variance of the two expectations series to the variance
of nominal income change and of the inflation rate. They find that periods with large
variances of nominal income change and of the inflation rate are also periods of close550 Money and Interest Rates
Unfortunately, no similar independent estimates of price expectations
are available for the earlier period, so there is no way of knowing whether
this finding simply is another reflection of a major break in recent decades
or is evidence against the long lags for the earlier period as well.
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association between the level of interest rates and the variability of expectations, and they
suggest "the need to reformulate Fisher's theory of interest for the case of heterogeneous
expectations" (p. 607). A. Cukierman and P. Wachtel, "Differential Inflationary Expecta-
tions and the Variability of the Rate of Inflation: Theory and Evidence," American
Economic Review 69 (September 1979): 595-609.
For the United Kingdom, see J. A. Carlson and M. Parkin, "Inflation Expectations,"
Economica 42 (May 1975): 123-38; and D. Demery and N. Duck, "The Behavior of
Nominal Interest Rates in the United Kingdom, 1961-73," Economica 45 (February 1978):
23-27. Demery's and Duck's finding that there is a great deal of evidence that inflation
expectations have some role in determining nominal interest rates is disputed by John
Foster, "Interest Rates and Inflation Expectations: The British Experience," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41 (May 1979): 145-64, who reports only limited
evidence, "certainly from 1961-66 and probably from 1966-77" (p. 162). See also K.
Holden and D. A. Peel, "An Empirical Investigation of Inflationary Expectations," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 39 (November 1977): 291-99.
Australian data on price expectations of consumers reported quarterly for a five-year
period are analyzed by L. V. Defris and R. A. Williams, "Quantitative versus Qualitative
Measures of Price Expectations," Economic Letters 2, no. 2, (1979): 169-73. They conclude
that the quantitative level of expected price change was "about right" and that "prediction
of quarter-to-quarter fluctuations was moderately successful" (p. 173), but that qualitative
forecasts were of little value. The paper was concerned solely with the price expectations.
67. One approach that has been attempted to obtain an independent series of anticipa-
tions is to derive them from futures prices of commodities as recorded on futures markets.
Unfortunately this approach has foundered on the highly special composition of the
commodities traded on active futures markets so that anticipations about changes in the
relative price of these commodities appear to have swamped anticipations about changes in
the general price level.
A more successful experiment is contained in an interesting paper by Jacob A. Frenkel, in
which he used the forward exchange rate to estimate price anticipations during the German
hyperinflation ("The Forward Exchange Rate, Expectations, and the Demand for Money:
The German Hyperinflation," American Economic Review 57 [September 1977]: 653-70).
However, this approach is available only during periods of floating exchange rates and even
then gives expectations of changes in relative prices in two countries—limitations of no
importance for the German hyperinflation, but of great importance for most periods.
Another approach is used by Cukierman with Israeli data, where the coexistence of
indexed and nonindexed bonds provides a reasonably direct measure of the anticipated rate
of inflation (not exact because of differences in the time duration and risk elements of the
two categories of securities). In an interesting and important paper, he uses such a measure
to test various assumed expectational processes, concluding that what he calls a "general-
ized linear process" gives the best approximation. The process, a modified version of a
process presented by J. A. Frenkel ("Inflation and the Formation of Expectations," Journal
of Monetary Economics 1 [October 1975]: 403-21), is one in which the anticipated rate of
inflation is a weighted average of past rates, the set of weights being decomposable into two
components, one, extending over a few months only, which is extrapolative, the other,
extending over thirty months, which is regressive. The process is dominated by the regres-
sive component, the weights for which first rise and then decline. Cukierman concludes that
"the generalized linear expectational process is not inconsistent with the concept of rational551 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
A more indirect approach that has been increasingly adopted in recent
studies of the Gibson paradox and Fisher's hypothesis has been to ask
whether it would have been rational for people to form their anticipations
by such a long weighted average of past price experience. The answer is
by no means clear or simple. The question, stated differently, is dual:
first, insofar as past prices give information on future rates of inflation,
does the long weighting pattern required to explain interest rate behavior
extract that information efficiently? Second, was there information read-
ily available to participants in the relevant markets, other than past
prices, which would have enabled them to improve their prediction of
future rates of inflation? If the answer to the first question were no, or the
answer to the second yes then participants would have overlooked profit-
making opportunities if they had neglected such information and had
insisted on using the long weighted averages Fisher attributed to them:
markets would have been inefficient. If the answer to the first question
were yes, but the answer to the second no, Fisher's procedure would
encapsulate the entire anticipatory process. Finally, if the answer to both
questions were yes, Fisher's procedure would be incomplete, but not
necessarily invalid, since it would correspond to the extraction from the
price data of the information that it contains.
If Fisher's explanation of the Gibson paradox is not valid, that does not
of course mean that markets are inefficient. It may rather reflect a lack of
constancy in the ex-ante real rate or a different process of forming
anticipations.
This indirect approach, like the calculations along Fisher's lines, has
yielded very different results for recent and earlier decades. For the
post-World War II period for the United States, Shiller and Fama
conclude that short and long interest rates are consistent with both a
constant real rate and rational expectations.
6
8 Two more recent papers
question Fama's finding of a constant real rate, but not of an efficient
market.
6
9 Rutledge finds that, for recent decades, information other than
expectations" (p. 749). Alex Cukierman, "A Test of Expectational Processes Using In-
formation from the Capital Market—the Israeli Case," International Economic Review 18
(October 1977): 737-53.
68. Shiller, "Rational Expectations and the Structure of Interest Rates" Fama, "Short-
Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation." See note 6 above.
69. Hess and Bicksler, "Capital Asset Prices versus Time Series Models"; Nelson and
Schwert, "Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation." See note 6 above. Both
pairs of authors find Fama's procedure defective in allowing only for a single monthly
autocorrelation of interest rates rather than a longer series. In a later article that makes no
reference to either of these papers, Fama finds evidence of variation in the real rate but
concludes that "only a trivial fraction of the sample variance" of the ex-post real return on
one-month Treasury bills "can be attributed to the measured variation" in the ex-ante
expected real rate. Eugene F. Fama, "Inflation Uncertainty and Expected Returns on
Treasury Bills," Journal of Political Economy 84 (June 1976): 427-48; quotation from
p. 444.552 Money and Interest Rates
past price movements, namely, past monetary growth rates, can be used
to improve predictions of future inflation. However, Feige and Pearce
reach the opposite conclusion for roughly the same period and price data
but by a different set of statistical procedures.
7
0 Dwyer concludes, along
with Rutledge, that "Fisher's hypothesis is able to explain the upward
movement of interest rates and price levels since the early 1950's."
7
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While the results for recent decades confirm the broad outlines of
Fisher's approach, they reject his particular empirical hypothesis about
the formation of expectations. Indeed, they come close to denying the
existence of the Gibson paradox, which was the occasion for his hypoth-
esis.
The situation is very different for earlier decades. For the United
States for 1870-1940, Sargent finds that the weighted average of past
price changes that gives the best predictions of future inflation has a much
shorter average lag than the weighted average that Fisher used—an
average much more like that which Yohe and Karnosky found for the
1960s. Sargent concludes that "it is difficult both to accept Fisher's
explanation of the Gibson paradox and to maintain that the extraordi-
narily long lags in expectations are 'rational.'" However, this conclusion
is based on calculations that include World War I, when, as we have seen,
there was no Gibson paradox to explain. Siegel and Shiller conclude for
both the United States and the United Kingdom for a much longer
pre-World War II period that the data are not consistent with a constant
real rate plus rational anticipations of inflation.
7
2 In a highly perceptive
comment on Sargent's paper, Gordon points out that, through World
War II, the major instances of significant inflation and deflation were
concentrated in time and connected with episodes that were widely
70. John Rutledge, A Monetarist Model of Inflationary Expectations (Cambridge, Mass.:
Lexington, 1974); Edgar L. Feige and Douglas K. Pearce, "Economically Rational Ex-
pectations: Are Innovations in the Rate of Inflation Independent of Innovations in Mea-
sures of Monetary and Fiscal Policy?" Journal of Political Economy 84 (June 1976):
499-522. Rutledge uses multiple correlation and relates an interest rate to other series;
Feige and Pearce use Box-Jenkins techniques and do not use interest rates, instead investi-
gating whether the residuals from ARIMA models fitted to time series of prices are
correlated with residuals from ARIMA models fitted to time series of various monetary
aggregates and the full employment surplus. They find no correlation. This procedure is
eminently sensible for investigating the best way to forecast short-term movements in
prices. However, it provides only limited evidence on the very different question of the
effect of monetary or fiscal forces on the course of prices, since for the most part the
important question about those effects has to do with the longer-term systematic move-
ments that are expressly abstracted from in the ARIMA models.
71. Dwyer, "Explanation of the Gibson Paradox," p. 112.
72. Sargent, "Interest Rates and Prices in the Long Run," quotation from p. 402; Shiller
and Siegel, "Gibson Paradox." See also Thomas J. Sargent, "Interest Rates and Expected
Inflation: A Selective Summary of Recent Research," Explorations in Economic Research 3
no. 3 (summer 1976): 303-25.553 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
recognized as special (World Wars I and II, post-World War I contrac-
tion, and the Great Depression). Hence, he argues, it would have been
irrational to extrapolate them mechanically to the future. He interprets
post-World War II experience as more favorable to a mechanical extra-
polation, though with a short lag, because inflation has become a part of a
standard political-economic response mechanism.
7
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Any shortcoming of Fisher's explanation of the Gibson paradox does
not, of course, in any way diminish the importance of his distinction
between real and nominal interest rates, or his distinction between ex-
post and ex-ante real rates, or his emphasis on the anticipated rate of
inflation as affecting both the demand for and supply of loanable funds.
But it does put in serious doubt his highly special composite hypothesis
that for the purpose of studying monetary influences on interest rates the
ex-ante real rate can be treated as constant, and that interest rates follow
the level of prices because borrowers and lenders estimate future inflation
by a long weighted average of past rates of inflation.
Gordon's comment brings out a key limitation of all the empirical work
covering long periods, including not only that of Sargent and of Siegel
and Shiller, but also that of Fisher himself. With one minor exception for
Sargent, to which we shall return, and more extensive exceptions for
Fisher, all the calculations on which they base their conclusions span the
World War I period. But we have seen that there was no Gibson phe-
nomenon from before to after World War I. Their results may simply
reflect the attempt to explain a nonexistent phenomenon and may be
entirely consistent with a very different verdict on the Fisher hypothesis
for the pre-World War I period alone, or for the interwar period alone.
It is noteworthy that while in the text Fisher stressed the periods
including World War I, he systematically got lower correlations and
shorter mean lags for periods excluding World War I: for United States
short rates, only 10.2 quarters or two and one-half years for 1890-1914,
compared with over ten years for 1915-1927; for United Kingdom long
rates, 7.1 years for 1820-64, and 8.2 years for 1865-97, compared with ten
years for 1898-1924.
The one exception in Sargent's paper is a calculation for 1880-1914 of
the optimum prediction of the change in the annual wholesale price index
on the basis of an exponentially weighted average of past price changes.
He estimates that the optimum mean lag is very short (one quarter).
7
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73. Robert J. Gordon, "Interest Rates and Prices in the Long Run: A Comment,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 5, no. 1, part 2 (February 1973): 460-65.
74. Sargent, "Interest Rates and Prices in the Long Run," table 2.1, p. 398. Let gP refer
to the continuous rate of price change (first difference of the natural log of price), and let
1 = 0
where b is the weight given gp(t).554 Money and Interest Rates
However, that optimum gives essentially no information on future price
changes, since the weighted average computed from weights adding to
unity is to be multiplied by 0.06. In effect, his formula reduces to a
weighted average of a zero price change and an exponentially weighted
average of prior price changes, with the zero price change receiving 94
percent of the weight. Moreover, the correlation between his exponen-
tially weighted average and the actual subsequent price change is close to
zero (for thirty-five observations, it is .062),
7
5 which is, of course, why it
receives so little weight. Taken at its face value, Sargent's conclusion is
that a zero price change was the optimum prediction for each year
1880-1914 based solely on past price data.
Sargent's result cannot, however, be accepted at face value. In the first
place, it is disproportionately influenced by the one year 1880, in which
wholesale prices averaged more than 11 percent higher than in 1879 as a
result of the reaction to resumption—again, one of those special events
that participants were surely aware of at the time and would not have
regarded as simply another year to be extrapolated. Omit 1880, and
Sargent would have come out with a much longer optimum lag (probably
averaging about six to nine years) and would have given it greater weight
in averaging it with a zero price change prediction.
7
6
In the second place, the correlation between the interest rate and the
actual annual price change, though low, is higher than between the
interest rate and Sargent's predicted price change both including 1880
and excluding 1880." The implication is that market participants had
information in addition to price changes ending a year earlier. And of
course they did. They not only knew about such events as resumption, the
silver agitation, the defeat of free silver in 1896, and the like, but also had
more current price information. Except at the very outset of a calendar
year, the participants had price information for the earlier part of that
calendar year itself.
Then the average period of the weights is b 2 j(l - b)' = —- .
b
Given that the result is to be used for the next calendar year, the average period of the lag
can be described as 1 + .
b
Sargent's estimate of b is .79, or a mean period of weights of roughly one quarter, or
prediction lag of one and one-quarter years.
In this formula the weights are for discrete time units. The version for continuous time is
given in note 83.
75. We have calculated this and all later correlations for annual data using the implicit
price index as well as wholesale prices. The results differ only in detail.
76. Omitting 1880 raises the correlation between price change a year later and the
weighted average from .06 to .24 for b = .79 but from .14 to .35 for b = .14, that is, a mean
weight lag of about six years; and from .16 to .32 for b = .10, that is, a mean weight lag of
about nine years.
77. The correlations are .24 and .02 including 1880; and .29 and .04 excluding 1880.555 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
In the third place, our comparison of United States and United King-
dom interest rates led us to conclude that anticipated inflation in the
United States was systematically above the actual before 1896 and
perhaps the reverse after because of abatement of the fears of devalua-
tion engendered by the free silver movement. We assessed the United
Kingdom-United States difference on this account as one percentage
point, which may well be a decided underestimate of the effect of the
resolution of the free silver issue on anticipations.
7
8 If the interest rate
before 1896 is adjusted for this effect by subtracting one percentage
point, the correlation of the adjusted interest rate with the actual rate of
price change (excluding 1880) is raised from .29 to .46, the correlation of
the adjusted interest rate with Sargent's predicted price change, from .04
to .31; and with a predicted price change using a longer lag averaging six
or nine years, from .03 or .06 to .45.
7
9 It also raises the Gibson paradox
correlation of the interest rate with the price level from .23 to .57.
Using the annual data solely for 1880-1914, instead of, as Sargent does
in most of his calculations, for 1880-1940 and allowing for the effect of
other information than prior price change, thus gives a rather different
impression. Fisher's explanation of the Gibson phenomenon is by no
means confirmed, but, at the very least, it cannot be ruled out.
Similar calculations for the United Kingdom for annual data for 1880-
1914 show a higher Gibson correlation of the interest rate with the price
level for the United Kingdom than for the United States (.60 versus .30
for the United States unadjusted interest rate and .45 for the United
States adjusted interest rate), and also a higher correlation with the rate
of price change than for the United States unadjusted interest rate (.44
versus .24), but a slightly lower correlation with the rate of price change
than for the United States adjusted interest rate (.44 versus .49). How-
ever, for the United Kingdom, an estimate of anticipated inflation using
Sargent's weights gives a higher correlation with interest rates than
estimates using the weights extending over a longer period.
8
0 This result
reflects the higher contemporaneous correlation with the rate of price
change and presumably also a higher serial correlation of the rate of price
change in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In any event, all
the correlations with anticipated inflation are higher than for the United
States, so that United Kingdom data in no way contradict the tentative
conclusion for the United States stated in the preceding paragraph.
78. The 1 percent estimate relies on the same exchange rate throughout, but we have
seen that purchasing power party would have called for 1 percent per year appreciation of
the United States dollar before 1896 and 1 percent per year depreciation of the United
States dollar thereafter. Adding these effects would give an estimate of three percentage
points as the effect of the resolution of the free silver issue on anticipations.
79. A larger adjusment equal to the three percentage points of the preceding footnote
would make all these effects considerably greater.
80. Correlations of .42 for Sargent's weight for b = .79, .37 for b = .14, .40 for b = .10.556 Money and Interest Rates
Dwyer reaches essentially the same conclusion for the pre-1914 period
for the United States and the United Kingdom on the basis of a more
complex test of the consistency of the price and interest rate series with




Similarly, Harley, in a recent careful study of British pre-World War I
experience concludes "that during periods of sustained price movement,
the money market adjusted to price expectations and there was little
effect on real interest rates." He thus supports Fisher's interpretation and
our own finding. He estimates that the mean lag in formulating expecta-
tions of future price changes from past price changes was about seven
years for short-term rates, about ten to thirteen years for long-term rates.
These are even longer lags than Fisher got for the pre-World War I data
for both the United States and the United Kingdom. Hence, though
Harley's results seem strongly to support Fisher's interpretation of the
United Kingdom Gibson phenomenon, they must share the doubt that
attaches to such long estimated lags.
8
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One incidental by-product of our analysis is to illustrate a limitation of
much recent work on rational expectations. One way that concept has
been made operational is by regarding rationality of expectations as
requiring that on the average the expectations are correct and hence by
testing rationality of expectations by direct or indirect comparison of
expectations with the actual subsequent values of the variables about
which expectations were formed. But consider the period from 1880 to
1896. It was surely not irrational according to a commonsense interpreta-
tion of that term for participants in the financial markets to fear that
growing political support for free silver would lead the United States to
depart from the gold standard and to experience subsequent inflation—
and this despite actual deflation during the period. Indeed, the longer the
deflation proceeded, the more pressure built up for free silver, and the
higher an intelligent observer might well have set his personal probability
of inflation within, say, three years.
As it happened, the departure from gold was avoided. That does not
prove that the persons who bet the other way were wrong—any more
than losing a two to one wager that a fair coin will turn up heads proves
that it was wrong to take the short end of that wager. Given a sufficiently
long sequence of observations, of course, it could be maintained that all
such events will ultimately average out, that in the century of experience
our data cover, for example, there are enough independent episodes so
that it is appropriate to test rationality of expectations by their average
81. Dwyer, "Explanation of the Gibson Paradox," pp. 106, 112.
82. C. Knick Harley, "The Interest Rate and Prices in Britain, 1873-1913: A Study of the
Gibson Paradox," Explorations in Economic History 14 (February 1977): 69-89, quotation
from p. 73.557 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
accuracy. But that is cold comfort, since few studies cover so long a
period, and our aim is surely to derive propositions that can be applied to
shorter periods. Moreover, even one hundred years contain only six
periods as long as that from 1880 to 1896, hardly a sufficiently large
sample to assure "averaging out." Beyond these practical considerations
there is a tantalizing intellectual question—What meaning, if any, can be
given to the assertion: "Mr X's personal probability about a specified
event was correct [or wrong]"?
To return to our main theme, our analysis of the annual data for 1880 to
1914 confirms the tentative indications of our earlier examination of
charts 10.15, 10.16, and 10.17. There is some muted evidence of the
Fisher effect, but it is clearly not the only, or even the most important
effect at work—which still leaves the possibility that it may well be the
feature that explains the Gibson phenomenon, since that too turns out, in
a longer context, to be a much more limited relation than it is often
represented as being.
We can use our phase average data to explore further the Fisher
explanation for the subperiods excluding wars, in order to estimate the
mean periods over which expectations would have had to be formed to
explain the observed relation between the price level and interest rates,
and to compare these mean periods for the two countries and the three
nonwar subperiods.
We start with equation (6) rearranged and renumbered for conveni-
ence:
(10) R = P*+g*P.
This is simply a definitional equation, defining the ex-ante anticipated
real yield, p*, as a function of the observed interest rate R and the
anticipated price change. To give equation (10) content, assume that p*
can be treated as a constant except for random disturbances, and that
gP*, aside from any special adjustments such as we have made above for
the period 1880-96, can be regarded as determined by a simple adaptive
expectational model:
(11) D(gP) = V(gP-gP),
where D(g%) is the time derivative of gp. This, of course, gives the usual
exponentially weighted average of past price changes as an estimate of gp,
that is
(12) g*P(T) = p/ y^-
 T>)gp(T')dT ,
with a mean lag = — .
8
3
83. This is the continuous version of the discontinuous form of footnote 74 above. The b
of that footnote is equal to 1 - e"
p, which, for small (3, is approximately equal to p.558 Money and Interest Rates
Differentiating equation (10) with these assumptions and adding a
random disturbance term, we have
(13) D(R) = D(g*P) + e = £(gP - g*P) + e.
Now let |3 be small, so anticipations are formed only gradually; that is, in
the long moving average of imperfectly correlated terms that defines gP*,
a long period of prior price change receives an appreciable weight. Such a
moving average will tend to vary less than its elements, and the longer the
moving average, the less variable it will be. As p approaches zero, gP*
approaches the price level, which is nearly a constant by comparison with
the rates of price change. Hence, the smaller (3, the more will equation
(13) be dominated by the term in gP.
M
84. The relative importance of the two terms in equation (13) depends on the relative
variance of gP and g*. Assume that g* has been expressed as a deviation from its expected
value, so we can take it as having a mean of zero (this is equivalent to adding a constant to
equation 11), then from equation 12,
(a) o
2^ = E[p JZe-^-








)E\gp (T')gp (T")] dT'dT",
where E stands for expected value.
E[gP(T) gp(T")] is the covariance function. If gP(T) is a stationary time series, we can for
T > T" write the covariance function as
(b) E[gP(T') gP(T") ] = ^gpr{T - T"),
where r(T - T") is the correlogram giving the correlation coefficient between gP (T) and
gP(T") as a function of the interval between 7" and T". Note further that the double integral
in equation (a), with limits running from -°° to T for both 7" and T" equals twice the
integral over the half phase from 7" = - °° to T, T" = - °° to T,' thanks to the symmetry of
the integral around 7" = T". Converting the double integral to twice the integral over the
half phase, replacing (T- T") in the exponent of e by (T- T + T - T") and substituting











t = T - T"
dT dT" = - dT dt,
noting that 7" goes from +oo to 0 as T" goes from — » to T'. This gives
(d) ok = 2agp p
2 j^ r0 e-W-V ~ P
fr(7) dt dT,
(e) o^ = a
2p [(3 /- e ~ ^r(T) dt\[2p /J. e "
 2p(T"
 T)dT].
The second bracket is equal to unity. The first is a weighted average of the correlogram with
exponentially declining weights summing to unity. Call this r((3). We then have
Since r(T) is less than unity, so is r(3), hence a
2^ is less than cr
2^ for all p. Moreover, so559 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
At the extreme, if we suppose gp to be roughly a constant, equation
(13) is a linear relation between the rate of change of interest rates and
the rate of change of prices. This is the mathematical translation, for a
special case, of Fisher's explanation of the Gibson paradox.
Without going to this extreme, we can use equation (13) to construct an
estimate of p. If the disturbance term e is uncorrelated with gP and gp, the
least-squares regressions of D(R) on gP and of gP on D(R) give upper and
lower limits for (3.
8
5
These limits have some rather interesting properties. As (3 approaches
zero, the percentage difference between p and the lower limit approaches
zero, while both the percentage and the absolute difference between (3
long as r(t) declines on the average with 7" and approaches zero as t approaches infinity,
r(3) will decline as p declines and approach zero as P approaches zero.
85. The expected value of the slope of the least-squares regression of D(R) on gP is given,
to a first approximation, by
(a\ r?h E[D(R)gP] p E[gP - g*P) gp + EegP Kg)
 Eb
where D(R), gP, and g*P are expressed as deviations from their mean values. If we assume





If we multiply gp* as given by equation (12) by gP, take expected values, and replace
E gP gP by r(T - T")(j
2g from equation (b) of footnote 83, we have
W EgP gP = f(p) a
2gp = v
2gp
by equation (f). Substituting in equation (h)
(j) E bD(R}gp = p[l — r(p)].
Since r(P) is necessarily less than unity,
(k) E bD{R)gp < p.
Similarly, the expected value of the reciprocal of the slope of the least-squares regression
of gP on D(R) is given to a first approximation by
(1) _1 = E[D (R)]
2 = p
2 E[gP - gp]
2 + a
2
KbgpD(R)> E[ D(R) gP] p a2 ^ [x _ ?(p)]
where a
2 is the variance of the random disturbance. Also
(m) E[gP - g^]
2 = a
2 + fafH - 2£(gpg;)
gP ' 'vi-v
w gp ^'vny" gP
from equations (f) and (1). It follows that
since both numerator and denominator of the fraction in the brackets are positive.560 Money and Interest Rates
and the upper limit increase without limit. Hence, the lower p, the better
the lower limit and the worse the upper limit as approximations. Another
interesting property is that the lower limit is not affected by the size of the
random disturbances in D(R), while the upper limit is. The upper limit is
a better approximation the smaller such random variation in R relative to
the random variation in gP, and it approaches p as the variance of R
approaches zero relative to the variance of gP.
m From the earlier calcula-
tions in this chapter, it seems clear that recorded values of gP have a much
higher variance than recorded values of D(R), which strongly suggests
that the upper limit may prove a pretty good approximation to p.
8
7 Note
that the upper limit for |3 gives the lower limit for the mean lag.
Table 10.8 gives the limits on p computed from the regressions of gP on
D(R) and D(R) on gP. The results are reasonably satisfactory for the
pre-World War I period, for which the Gibson phenomenon is most
marked.
8
8 The limits are both farther apart and lower for the United
States than for the United Kingdom. However, given the small number of
degrees of freedom for the United Kingdom, the United States and
United Kingdom limits do not differ significantly. Moreover, adding
additional values of price change in the multiple correlation has almost no
effect on the standard error of estimate for the United States—which is as
it should be, since their only role is as proxies for gP* which, on the
interpretation under discussion, is contributing little to the relation. The
sharp reduction for the United Kingdom is meaningless, since including
all the additional variables leaves only one degree of freedom.
The implied mean period of averaging of past price behavior is be-
tween five and twenty-five years for the United States, three and five
86. These statements follow directly from equations (j) and (n) of the preceding foot-
note, plus the fact that r(p) approaches zero as p approaches zero.
One other factor affecting the closeness of the limits to p is the serial correlation of gP.
The lower that correlation for each time interval between the items correlated, the lower is
r(p) for each p and hence the closer the limits to one another and to p.
87. The standard deviations of D(R) and gP (in percentage points) are as follows for the
three nonwar periods:
United States United Kingdom
















Of course these standard deviations include systematic as well as random variation, and
measurement error as well as random variation in the magnitude being measured, so they
are only suggestive rather than conclusive. But the differences are so large and so consistent
as to establish a strong presumption that the random variation in gP as measured is very large
compared with that in D(R) as measured.
88. For the United States, the pre-World War I limits without adjusment for the free
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years for the United Kingdom. These intervals differ from Fisher's own
estimates, which are shorter for the pre-1914 period for the United States
(2.5 years), longer for the United Kingdom long rates for the pre-1914
period (7.3 for 1820-64, and 8.7 for 1865-97).
As we noted earlier, the lower relative variation in D(R) than in gP
suggests that the upper estimate of p—which corresponds to the lower
mean period—is the closer approximation to the true p. If so, that would
suggest a mean period of about three years for the United Kingdom, five
years for the United States, which is somewhat shorter than the mean
period obtained earlier in our reanalysis of the annual data for the United
States, 1881 to 1914. Certainly, periods of this length seem more plausi-
ble than the periods running two or three times as long that Fisher and
others estimate for data spanning World War I.
For the interwar period, the United States results are very similar,
again consistent with a mean period of four to ten years. However, for the
United Kingdom, the slope of the regression is negative, which gives
unacceptable results. For the postwar period, we again see the break we
have repeatedly encountered in this chapter: for the United States, zero
correlation between D(R) and gP; for the United Kingdom, a mild
correlation, but one which gives a mean period of five to sixteen years.
For the pre-World War I period we have also used the phase averages
to duplicate the calculations made earlier for the annual data from 1880 to
1914 for different weighting patterns. In these calculations, we have used
the phase as the time unit and have converted the values of b equal to
0.10, 0.14, and 0.79 to corresponding values for phases by allowing for
the average length of a phase.
8
9 The results are again that the longer
average weighting patterns, corresponding to annual b's equal to 0.10 and
0.14, give higher correlations for the United States than the shorter
weighting pattern derived by Sargent. For the United States it is striking
also that for annual fe's equal to 0.10 and 0.14 the correlation of the
adjusted commercial paper rate with the expected rate of price change is
higher than with the price level, thereby meeting one of Macaulay's
objections. That is not true for the United Kingdom.
9
0
89. Our procedure was first to calculate the value of p equivalent to each value of b,
multiply the resultant values of (3 by the average length of a phase, and then convert back to
6's. The resulting values of b are .186, .255, and .952 for the United States, .318, .422, and
.997 for the United Kingdom.
In making these calculations, we used gP.A instead of gP.
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All in all, the net result of these additional calculations is to reinforce
our earlier suggestion that Fisher's hypothesis is plausible for the pre-
World War I period, somewhat plausible for the interwar period, but not
at all plausible for the post-World War II period.
10.7.2 The Wicksell-Keynes Explanation
Writing at the turn of the century, Knut Wicksell suggested that the
parallel movement of prices and interest rates reflected long swings in the
real yield on capital mediated through the commercial banking system. A
rise, for example, in the productivity of capital would produce a rise in the
demand for credit and in the "natural" rate of interest—the rate that
would equate desired saving with desired investment in a situation of
"monetary neutrality" or "monetary equilibrium," that is, without
monetary creation. Faced with an increase in the demand for loanable
funds, Wicksell argued, banks would expand their loans by creating
money, letting the ratio of their liabilities to their reserves rise, and would
only belatedly and sluggishly raise the rate of interest they charge. The
"market" rate would respond to the increased demand, but too little and
too late. The monetary expansion would raise prices; the reaction of
banks would slow the rise in market interest rates but not prevent a rise
from occurring, so that prices and interest rates would rise together.




Cagan has examined this hypothesis in detail for the United States. He
found that changes in monetary growth primarily reflected changes in
high-powered money rather than in bank-created money, as required by
the Wicksell hypothesis. Lars Jonung has since carried out a similar
analysis for Sweden. His conclusion is the same as Cagan's: the sources of




A different test of the Wicksell hypothesis can be made using our proxy
for the real yield on capital. On the Wicksell hypothesis, the moving force
in the whole process is the real yield on capital. Its fluctuations produce
R and P
United States (unadjusted) .54
United States (adjusted) .64
United Kingdom .72
91. For an excellent summary statement of this hypothesis, see Wicksell, "The Influence
of the Rate of Interest on Prices." For Keynes's later presentation, see A Treatise on Money,
2: 182-84.
92. Phillip Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960
(New York: NBER, 1965), pp. 252-55; Lars Jonung, "Money and Prices in Sweden,
1732-1972," in Inflation in the World Economy, ed. J. M. Parkin and George Zis (Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press, 1976), pp. 295-325.564 Money and Interest Rates
parallel fluctuations in the price level and the nominal market rate.
Accordingly, the Wicksell hypothesis implies a Gibson phenomenon for
real and not merely nominal yields. Chart 10.21 and table 10.9 demon-
strate that no such phenomenon exists either for our proxy for the real
yield or for the ex-post real yield on short-term securities: with minor
exceptions, there is a negligible correlation between the level of prices
and the real yields, not only for the long periods for which, as we have
seen, no nominal Gibson phenomenon exists, but also for the shorter
subperiods. This test too therefore rejects the Wicksell hypothesis.
10.7.3 Other Real Explanations
The Wicksell hypothesis is a special case of a broader class of hypoth-
eses that postulate common real disturbances that affect the price level
and nominal interest rates in the same direction. Among others, Sargent
has suggested an explanation of this class in the form of a specific
hypothetical model of the economy.
9
3
To illustrate such an explanation, consider the brief business cycles
during which there is clearly a tendency for prices and interest rates to rise
and fall together—indeed, in his discussion of the Gibson paradox
Keynes referred to his initial belief, subsequently rejected, "that Mr.
Gibson's surprising results were to be attributed to nothing more than the
well-established and easily explained tendency of prices and interest to
rise together on the upward phase of the credit cycle, and to fall together
on the downward phase plus a gracious allowance of mere coincidence."
9
4
Any theory of business cycles, be it a "real" theory relying on waves of
optimism and pessimism a la Pigou, or bunchings of innovation a la
Schumpeter, or an unstable investment function a la Keynes, or even
Jevonian sunspots, or be it a monetary theory relying on fluctuations in
monetary growth, could produce (1) a cyclical rise and fall in the demand
for loanable funds relative to the supply of loanable funds and so a
cyclical rise and fall in real and nominal interest rates; (2) a cyclical rise
and fall in nominal income relative to permanent income and so a
procyclical movement in measured velocity; (3) reinforcement of the
movement in measured velocity by a reaction of the quantity of money
demanded to the cyclical movement in interest rates; (4) a procyclical
movement in monetary growth in reaction to the cyclical movement in
the demand for loanable funds and in interest rates, which would rein-
force the cyclical movement in nominal income, while damping some-
what the movement in interest rates and in velocity; and (5) a cyclical rise
and fall in prices (or in prices relative to trend) as a result of the changes in
93. "Interest Rates and Prices in the Long Run." Sargent's model could indeed almost be
regarded as a formal translation of Wicksell.
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nominal income. Items 1 and 5 together would produce the Gibson
phenomenon of a positive correlation of interest rates and price levels,
and it would produce it for both nominal and real rates—in sharp contrast
to the Fisher interpretation, which posits such a correlation solely for
nominal rates.
Actual experience during business cycles differs in important respects
from this hypothetical sequence—notably in the empirical timing pat-
terns of interest rates, monetary growth, and measured velocity, as well
as in the apparent independence of monetary growth from interest
rates—but it also has many similarities. In any event, the hypothetical
sequence illustrates the kind of alternative hypothesis that Sargent and
others suggest.
For the longer-period swings that are our concern, as for the cyclical
fluctuations, there is no need for there to be a single source of real
disturbances. All that is required is that real disturbances that tend to
raise nominal interest rates should also tend to raise prices; and real
disturbances that tend to raise prices should also tend to raise interest
rates; or at least that one of these be correct and the other not reversed.
The real forces could operate on prices and interest rates through any of a
number of possible channels: on prices, through velocity or high-powered
money or bank-created money or volume of output; on interest rates,566 Money and Interest Rates
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through the equilibrium real interest rate or preferences for nominal
versus physical assets or preferences for nonhuman assets or the relative
quantities of various kinds of assets.
However, the finding that there is apparently no real Gibson phe-
nomenon for the longer swings (our correlations of phase bases give no
evidence on the intracycle movement) rules out any such explanation that
involves higher real returns along with prices. The real disturbances
would have to operate by affecting the relation between nominal and real
returns or in some other way be consistent with nominal but not real
returns moving in the same direction as prices.
The only explicitly spelled-out hypothesis of this kind that we are
aware of is one that was suggested by Macaulay some three decades ago
and that has recently been formally developed by Siegel as reflecting
distributional effects.
9
5 Siegel suggests that, if price rises are unantici-
pated they will tend to produce a transfer of wealth from lenders on fixed
interest terms to borrowers on such terms—a phenomenon that we have
certainly documented. He goes on to argue that this is a wealth transfer
from risk-averse persons to risk-takers, which would tend to raise the
95. Macaulay, Movements of Interest Rates, pp. 206-8; Jeremy J. Siegel, "The Correla-
tion between Interest and Prices: Explanations of the Gibson Paradox" (unpublished
manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 1975).567 Alternative Explanations of the Gibson Paradox
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Price level and real rate of return on physical assets, United
States and United Kingdom, 1870-1975.
differential between yields on securities attractive to the risk-averse and
those attractive to risk-takers. If recorded nominal rates are rates on
securities attractive to the risk-averse, the transfer could account for
rising nominal interest rates along with rising prices.
This ingenious explanation is, however, not satisfactory without addi-
tional highly special assumptions. Why would this effect not simply
produce an initial rise in the interest rate as the holders of nominal
securities lose wealth and then a fall as they seek to restore their wealth
and succeed in doing so? After all, the initial distribution of wealth is
itself the result of an equilibrating process, not an accidental position. As
in the Fisher explanation, there must be a coordination of various adjust-
ments to produce the result to be explained. Throughout most of a price
rise, it must continue to be unexpected, it must continue to transfer
wealth cumulatively (in order that rates of interest keep on rising), and568 Money and Interest Rates
this cumulative transfer must not be offset by the saving adjustments of
the risk-averse or the risk-takers or by the adjustment of interest rates to
actual inflation.
A good deal more elaboration of this hypothesis and testing of its
implications is required before it can be treated as more than an ingenious
speculation.
10.7.4 Other Nominal Explanations
A more promising approach is to proceed along Fisher's lines of
stressing the role of inflationary expectations but to alter his particular
hypothesis about the formation of expectations and possibly to include an
allowance for changing real returns on physical assets as well.
9
6 In effect,
this is what we have done in our examination of the pre-World War I
period for the United States by taking into account the effect of the free
silver movement on expectations and in our treating World War I and
World War II as special cases to be analyzed separately. It may be,
however, that such a largely episodic interpretation can be replaced, or at
least more fully supplemented, by a more formal model of the formation
of expectations. The extensive studies along these lines of the post-World
War II period may yet yield results that can be applied to the much longer
pre-World War II period, though as yet they have not done so.
One feature of the strict Fisher expectations hypothesis that seems
particularly objectionable in light of our empirical results—especially the
failure of the Gibson phenomenon to hold over major wars—is the use of
a single chronological time scale in converting past price experience to an
estimate for the future. We have already had occasion to refer to Maurice
Allais's perceptive distinction between chronological and psychological
time to explain why it might be more appropriate to use the cycle phase
rather than the year as our basic unit of time.
9
7 This is what we have done
in using our phase average data to analyze the pre-World War I relations.
In the present context, however, a wider-ranging interpretation is
called for. In judging the future, participants look back for past evidence
96. John Rutledge, "Irving Fisher and Autoregressive Expectations" (American Eco-
nomic Review Proceedings 67 [February 1977]: 200-205) argues that Fisher included
changes in real rates as part of his analysis, and Sargent makes a similar point (Quarterly
Journal of Economics 86 [May 1972]: 224-25). Both are correct but the role is played
primarily by changes in the ex-post real yield on nominal assets rather than by changes in
either the ex-ante real yield on nominal assets or the ex-ante or ex-post real yield on physical
assets. The latter do play a minor role in Fisher's analysis, but primarily in his analysis of
cyclical fluctuations rather than of Gibson swings, which are the real puzzle. Of course he
makes qualitative remarks that indicate his recognition of the existence of variability in real
returns of all kinds, and he stresses over and over the variability of ex-post real returns on
nominal assets, since they play, explicitly or implicitly, a crucial role in his analysis both of
the cycle and of the Gibson swings. See note 48 above.
97. See chap. 8, n. 17.569 Correlations with Money
that they regard most relevant to the current situation. That may involve
a very different retrospective time span at different times. Much of the
time it may involve looking back at a comparable stage of the business
cycle—that is the rationalization for using the cycle phase as a basic time
unit. But on some occasions that will not be relevant. For example,
consider the situation in the United States after World War II. According
to the first available Livingston forecasts, dated June 1947, the average
forecast for the succeeding eighteen months was for declining prices at
the rate of 5.8 percent per year for the consumer price index and of 8.7
percent per year for the wholesale price index, and the eighteen-month
forecasts stayed negative, though smaller in magnitude, until the Korean
War broke out in 1950.
9
8 Actual prices dipped briefly in 1949 and early
1950, but at nothing like the forecast rate. This expectation of deflation,
which was surely widespread, was obviously not based on any simple
weighted average of immediately prior rates of inflation—any such aver-
age would have led to a forecast of inflation. And it would have been most
unreasonable to use any such average. Wars are highly unusual events
known to be episodic. It was natural for participants to look back at what
had occurred after past wars: the war of 1812, the Civil War, and the First
World War. In each case the wartime inflation had been followed by a
postwar deflation that ultimately brought the level of prices back to
roughly its prewar level. It was not unreasonable to extrapolate that
experience, even though that involved averaging experience covering
roughly 150 years.
This example involves a process of formation of anticipations that is in
the spirit of Fisher's model but cannot be confined within its fixed mecha-
nical structure. Similarly, in allowing for the Great Depression it would
have been reasonable for participants to revert back to other major
cyclical contractions rather than to use an unchanging past time scale.
10.8 The Structural Change in the 1960s
Whether or not a more adequate explanation is developed for the
Gibson paradox than Fisher's supplemented by episodic events, there
remains the problem of accounting for the apparent difference between
pre-World War II relations and postwar relations, particularly after the
mid-1960s, when the Gibson relation largely disappears and is replaced
by a close relation between interest rates and the rate of change of prices.
An extremely appealing explanation of the difference has been offered
in an important paper by Benjamin Klein."
98. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts," table 1, p. 33, table 2, p. 35.
99. "Our New Monetary Standard: The Measurement and Effects of Price Uncertainty,
1880-1973," Economic Inquiry 13 (December 1975): 461-83. Klein has recalculated his
measures of short- and long-term price unpredictability in "The Measurement of Long- and570 Money and Interest Rates
Klein argues that there has been a fundamental change in the character
of the monetary system since World War II, that before World War II,
and to a lesser extent to the end of World War II, the United States and
the United Kingdom were regarded as being on specie standards which
limited the price level. Prices might rise or fall over short periods, but the
price level was widely expected to revert to a roughly constant level, and
it did. The price level in the United Kingdom in 1912 was roughly the
same as in 1729—so far as it can be measured over such long periods.
After the World War I rise, it again reverted to its prewar level by 1931 or
1932 and was lower than it had been during most of the nineteenth
century.
10
0 In the United States wholesale prices were at roughly the same
level in 1914 and in 1790 and, again after more than doubling during
World War I, had reverted to their 1790 level by 1932.
10
1 Under this
system, Klein argues, there was considerable short-term unpredictability
of prices but much less long-term unpredictability. Current rates of price
change contained little information about future rates of price change.
On the other hand, the level of prices did contain such information. A
price level that was high relative to "normal" implied a subsequent
decline in prices and conversely.
In the post-World War II period, short-term unpredictability of price
change, Klein points out, has been less than earlier. However, there is no
longer a specie anchor to the price system. The monetary system is strictly
fiduciary. There is no widespread anticipation that the price level will
revert to any "normal" level; it (or perhaps its derivative) is now nearly of
the nature of a random walk, perhaps with drift. Current rates of price
change contain information about future rates of price change. It is
rational to take this information into account, and interest rates now
respond to recent rates of price change as they did not do before.
This analysis is highly plausible as an explanation for the change after
World War II. Before World War I, and to a lesser extent in most of the
interwar period, the government's role in the economy in both the United
States and the United Kingdom was relatively minor and certainly did not
include, and was not perceived to include, the kind of attempt at fine-
tuning the economy that we have become so familiar with in recent
decades. At most, government's role was to step in at time of crisis or
panic and to administer a specie system. The sources of inflation or
deflation were largely international and were mostly acts of God rather
Short-Term Price Uncertainty: A Moving Regression Analysis," Economic Inquiry 16 (July
1978): 438-52; see also I. B. Ibrahim and R. M. Williams, "The Fisher Relationship under
Different Monetary Standards," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 10 (August 1978):
363-70.
100. For a long-term United Kingdom price series, see Shiller and Siegel, "The Gibson
Paradox," fig. 1.
101. Based on Warren and Pearson and BLS index numbers.571 The Structural Change in the 1960s
than deliberate acts of men. The basic institutions were highly stable, so it
made sense to take a long view, and there was no easy way to predict the
short-run or intermediate-run fluctuations of the price level. Given the
physical or at least nondeliberate character of most of the forces produc-
ing such fluctuations, it made sense for participants to extrapolate the
past along Fisher's lines. And, given the large degree of random fluctua-
tion and the meagerness and inaccuracy of the available data, it made
sense to base extrapolations on a fairly long past period.
10
2 The Fisher
hypothesis, or some variation of it, plus allowance for special events—
such as the free silver campaign in the United States or the Boer War in
the United Kingdom—plus a good deal of random perturbation plus
confidence in the long-run stability of the monetary system and the price
level could explain reasonably well the greater short-run stability in the
nominal yield than in the ex-post real yield, as well as the systematic
covariation of the nominal yield with the longer swings in the price level.
Beginning with the Great Depression, the situation changed drasti-
cally. Government began to accept responsibility for the short-term
movements in the economy. World War II interrupted the process and
doubtless postponed the incorporation of the new role of government
into the performance of financial markets. After the war there was a
transitional period of adjustment to wartime distortions. In addition,
there was widespread anticipation of a repetition of prior postwar experi-
ence, namely, a sharp decline in the price level and a severe recession or
depression. These anticipations dominated the market for more than a
decade after the war, producing the expectation of price decline despite
the experience of gradual inflation. The result was low nominal interest
rates and negative ex-post real yields—the mirror image of the situation
in the decade preceding 1896, when expectations of inflation coincided
with the actuality of deflation and produced high nominal rates and
ex-post real yields.
By the mid- or late 1950s, the participants in the market were adjusting
to the new circumstances, along the lines outlined by Klein. They came to
regard the price level and the level of economic activity as largely affected
by government authorities, and they saw the specie standard as a histori-
102. We should note that we are here departing from Klein's specific formulation
because it is not consistent with the Gibson phenomenon. If the public based its anticipation
of price movements on the relation between the current level of prices and some indepen-
dently estimated "normal" level, as Klein implies, then it should have interpreted high
prices as implying a subsequent decline. But this would mean low nominal interest rates
when prices were high and high nominal rates when prices were low—precisely the reverse
of the observed positive Gibson correlation. Alternatively, if the public took the current
price level as its best estimate of the "normal" level, that would imply that it took the
anticipated rate of price change as equal to zero at all times. Such anticipations would
produce a zero correlation between prices and interest rates, not the observed positive
Gibson correlation.572 Money and Interest Rates
cal relic. The final explicit step in this transformation did not occur until
the formal severing of the United States link with gold in 1971 and the
explicit adoption of a floating exchange rate system in 1973 and thereaf-
ter. But the postwar devaluations and revaluations of many currencies,
together with the obvious primacy of domestic considerations in the
formulation of government economic policy in essentially all countries,
affected attitudes long before this final step.
These changes in institutional arrangements made it easier to predict
short-term movements at the same time that, as Klein emphasizes, they
increased long-term uncertainty. They were also accompanied by im-
provements in statistics and in methods of analyzing data—as evidenced
particularly by the explosive growth of the short-term economic forecast-
ing industry—and in the sophistication and breadth of financial markets.
All this appreciably shortened the horizon of market participants and
increased their ability to make short-term projections. Simultaneously,
the incentive to make such projections and to embody them in financial
decisions was increased by the rise in the rate of inflation to levels seldom
experienced before in the peacetime experience of the United States and
the United Kingdom and by the considerable variation in the rate of
inflation over periods of several years. The net result has apparently been
to replace the long-term Gibson phenomenon with the short-term direct
Fisher relation between nominal rates and price change. Whether this is a
permanent or a temporary change is hard to judge. Presumably that
depends in part on whether high rates of inflation, and substantial varia-
tion in rates of inflation, persist.
One further element has encouraged the switch to the short-term
Fisher relation and perhaps has made it seem more complete than it really
is. That element is the high marginal tax rates levied on nominal yields.
As we saw in section 10.1.1 under "Price Anticipation Effect," the effect
of such taxation is to widen substantially the margin between the nominal
rate and the real rate required to keep unchanged the net real after-tax
yield to the lender. Some studies of the relation between nominal and real
rates that have concluded that nominal rates have fully adjusted to
inflation have neglected this tax effect.
10
3 What they take to be a full
adjustment is therefore less than full. For the United States, most long-
term bonds are apparently held by institutions not subject to tax on the
interest return (e.g., pension funds, insurance companies, tax-exempt
institutions). However, an appreciable fraction appears to be held by
taxable individuals. To judge from the differential return on taxable and
tax-exempt securities, the relevant marginal tax rate is over one-third.
10
4
If such a tax rate had applied in the United States during all nonwar
103. E.g., Fama, "Short-term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation."
104. In December 1979 the yield on corporate triple Aaa bonds was 10.74, on long-term
Treasury securities, 10.07, both taxable; on state and local Aaa bonds, exempt from federal
taxes, 6.50, equivalent to a marginal tax rate of 35 percent compared with Treasury573 Correlations with Money
Table 10.10 Nominal Rates of Interest Required, at Inflations of 6 or 10 Percent,



























phases averaged in table 10.1, the ex-post after-tax real short-term yield
would have been 2.3 percent instead of the 3.8 percent recorded there
without allowing for the effect of taxation, and the ex-post real long-term
yield would have been 2.7 instead of 4.4.To obtain the ex-post after-tax
real yields in table 10.1 with a 6 percent inflation and with a 10 percent
inflation for a hypothetical marginal tax rate of one-third would require
the nominal rates shown in table 10.10.
Actual commercial paper rates in the United States exceeded 11 per-
cent only briefly in 1974 when the contemporaneous recorded inflation
rate was running over 10 percent for consumer prices. At about the same
time corporate bond rates hit a peak of only a bit over 9 percent. In the
United Kingdom the short-term rate hit a peak of a bit over 14 percent in
early 1974, a year in which the average rate of inflation was over 20
percent for consumer prices and the long-term rate a peak of 17.4
percent. Clearly, interest rates did not adjust anything like fully to recent
rates of inflation, once the tax effect is taken into account. As in earlier
periods, much of the inflation must be regarded as unanticipated, so that
lenders have received real returns lower than the real yield on capital.
The difference from earlier periods is twofold. There has apparently been
a greater relative adjustment to inflation than in earlier periods. And
governments in their capacities as borrowers have benefited to a larger
extent than in earlier episodes from the transfer of wealth from lenders to
borrowers.




securities, of 39 percent compared with corporate securities. These differentials are not
atypical for recent years.
105. Even in 1980, after the end of our period, interest rates did not adjust anything like
fully to inflation, if taxes at a marginal rate of one-third are allowed for. In the United States,
the commercial paper rate hit a peak of over 16 percent, when inflation, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, averaged 13 percent; in the United Kingdom, the short-term rate hit574 Money and Interest Rates
10.9 Correlations with Money
This long detour through price effects may seem a digression from the
explicit subject of this chapter—money and interest rates. It is not. The
impact effects via liquidity and loanable funds, and the intermediate
effects via income, described in the initial theoretical analysis, can be
expected to be most important within cycles and largely to average out for
our cycle phases. That leaves the price effect as the major one for our
purpose. The long-term effect of money on interest rates can therefore be
analyzed best by considering the effect of money on prices—as we did in
chapter 9—and then of prices on interest rates, as we have done in this
chapter.
10.9.1 Impact and Intermediate Effects
Something of a check on these statements is provided by tables 10.11
and 10.12, which give correlations between money and interest rates
relevant to the impact and intermediate effects, and table 10.13, which
gives correlations relevant to the price effect.
The liquidity impact effect would tend to produce a negative correla-
tion between R (the interest rate) and M (the stock of money) or between
D(R) (the rate of change of the interest rate) and gM (the rate of change of
the stock of money). The simple correlations in column 3 between R and
M (table 10.11) and D(R) and gM (table 10.12) give little evidence of any
liquidity effect. Only two of the ten correlations between R and M, and
also between D(R) and gM, are negative, and the largest absolute correla-
tions are all positive. Clearly the Gibson effect—which would produce
positive correlations—has overwhelmed any liquidity effect for periods
as long as our phases.
10
6
The loanable funds impact effect would produce negative correlations
between R and gM, and between D(R) and D(gM) (the acceleration of the
stock of money). The simple correlations in column 4 show only a little
stronger evidence of the loanable funds effect than those in column 3 do
of the liquidity effect: three of the ten correlations between R and gM, and
also between D(R) and D(gM) are negative, but this time one of the
negative correlations is numerically the largest.
10
7
a peak of a trifle over 18 percent when retail prices were rising at a rate in excess of 20
percent.
106. For the United States, for the pre-World War I period, we have computed all the
correlations in tables 10.11 and 10.12 also for interest rates not adjusted for the effect of free
silver. The results differ only trivially from those in the tables.
107. In an interesting paper that analyzes the relation between monetary policy and
long-term interest rates using United States quarterly data for 1954-76, Frederic S. Mishkin
finds little or no evidence of the impact effect, which suggests that, for that period, our
failure to uncover it may not simply reflect our use of phase averages but may correspond to
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The intermediate-term income effect would produce positive correla-
tions between R and gM, and D(R) and D(gM), thus offsetting the
negative impact of the loanable funds impact effect. Clearly, the in-
termediate income effect too is not strongly reflected in the contempo-
raneous correlations of tables 10.11 and 10.12. Neither is it strongly
reflected in other correlations (not shown in the table) that allow for a lag
in effect. The most one can say is that perhaps the intermediate income
effect and the loanable funds impact effect are largely offsetting one
another in our phase average data, with sometimes one and sometimes
the other dominating, thereby producing mixed signs and small correla-
tions. But there is no direct support for that interpretation.
The multiple correlations are an attempt to allow simultaneously for
the various effects, instead of considering them one at a time. The
coefficient of M in the correlation with R reflects the liquidity effect, and
the coefficient of gM reflects the loanable funds effect, as perhaps offset
by the intermediate income effect. Similarly in the correlation with D(R),
the coefficient of gM reflects the liquidity effect, the coefficient of D(gM),
the mixed loanable funds and income effects. These multiple correla-
tions, like the simple correlations, show only muted reflections of the
impact and intermediate effects, though there are more negative coef-
ficients—three out of ten for M and six out of ten for gM in the correla-
tions with R\ two out of ten for gM and seven out of ten for D(gM) in the
correlations with D(R)—and several of the negative coefficients differ
significantly from zero.
As a further bit of evidence, in the correlations with R for the sub-
periods, we have also included a time term to correct for trend. These
correlations give little evidence of an appreciable liquidity or loanable
funds effect—only one of the ten coefficients of M is negative, and only
five of the ten coefficients of gM, and only one of these six negative
coefficients differs significantly from zero. The generally positive coef-
ficients presumably reflect the long-term price effect. Only the correla-
tions with D(R) give any appreciable evidence of any other effect, and
those support only a loanable funds effect.
All in all, these results suggest that our phases are long enough so that
averages for them show at most strongly damped impact and intermedi-
ate effects and are dominated by the price effects.
conclusion fits in well with the emergence of the Fisher effect as dominating the Gibson
effect in the later post-World War II period, that is, with the importance of the effect of
monetary changes on anticipations. However, for that very reason, Mishkin's result cannot
confidently be generalized to earlier periods when the Gibson effect was more important
than the Fisher effect ("Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates: An Efficient
Markets Approach," Journal of Monetary Economics 7 [January 1981]: 29-55).578 Money and Interest Rates



























































































































To supplement our earlier analysis of price effects we have calculated
the correlation between the level of interest rates and current and prior
rates of change of both money and prices (table 10.13). It is not at all clear
a priori which of these correlations should give a better relation. If the





























































































































































































































monetary changes and if some version of Fisher's interpretation of how
price anticipations are formed is accepted, then one might expect the
price correlations to be closer, on the argument that factors other than
money affect price movements and that such price movements should
have the same effect on interest rates as price movements reflecting
monetary change. On the other hand, the price series very likely are
subject to greater measurement errors than the monetary series, and580 Money and Interest Rates
monetary changes can be expected to affect interest rates through the
impact and intermediate effects, not only the price effects. On these
grounds one might expect the monetary correlations to be higher.
The empirical comparison of the two multiple correlations in table
10.13 is hindered by the small number of degrees of freedom available for
many of the computations for subperiods. Given that five constants are
fitted, only one degree of freedom remains for the United Kingdom for
the prewar period, only two for the interwar period for both countries
and four for the post-World War II period for the United Kingdom, and
only six for the United States for the post-World War II period. The
period as a whole, both excluding and including war phases, provides
more degrees of freedom but is unsatisfactory because of the significant
differences among the periods. Accordingly, we have computed addi-
tional correlations for the period as a whole including dummies to allow
for differences in the level of the interest rate in different periods.
For the three key nonwar periods separately, four of the money cor-
relations (including all three for the pre-World War I period) are supe-
rior to the price correlations and three are inferior, as shown by the
residual standard errors in columns 3 and 4.
All the results for the combined periods for both the United States and
the United Kingdom, when dummies are included, yield a lower residual
standard error for the money than for the price correlations, though some
of the differences are small. When dummies are not included, that is also
the result for the United States; but for the United Kingdom the residual
standard error is lower for the price correlations.
For the prewar period we have given correlations for the United States
for the original interest rate and also for the interest rate adjusted for the
free silver effect by subtracting one percentage point from values for
years before 1897. The adjusted results are markedly superior, and we
may concentrate our attention on them.
Given the small number of degrees of freedom and the paucity of
individual regression coefficients that differ significantly from zero, little
confidence can be attached to the time pattern of coefficients. Somewhat,
though not much, more can be attached to their sum. Moreover, theory
indicates that in principle their sum, if enough terms are included, should
approximate unity: that is, an indefinitely continued increase of one
percentage point per year in the rate of monetary growth will tend
ultimately to add one percentage point to the rate of price increase; and a
one percentage point higher rate of price increase will tend to widen the
difference between the nominal and real interest rates by one percentage
point and, if the real interest rate is unaffected (the qualification that
accounts for the "approximate" before unity), to raise the nominal
interest rate by unity.581 Correlations with Money
Table 10.14 Combined Effect of Current and Past Price and Monetary Changes
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As table 10.14 shows, the sum of the coefficients for money is between
zero and unity for the United States throughout, but for the United
Kingdom this is true only before World War I. However, these sums are
decidedly short of unity.
10
8 For the three nonwar periods combined, and
for the adjusted United States interest rate, the sum is less than one-third;
for the United Kingdom for the pre-World War I period alone it is less
than .6. The shortfall from unity may reflect the inability to include more
terms. More likely, it reflects our inability to allow for many other factors
affecting interest rates, which produce a downward bias in the regression
coefficients arising from error in the estimates of both monetary change
108. This contrasts sharply with Harley's results. He finds the effect to be unity for the
United Kingdom before World War I ("Interest Rate and Prices in Britain," p. 77).582 Money and Interest Rates
and interest rates and from correlated disturbances. For prices the results
are even less satisfactory.
We can also use the equations to estimate the interest rate that would
result if price change were zero: the ex-ante "real" interest rate implied
by these equations. For the price equations, this estimate is given directly
by the constant term, because that is the value corresponding to all rates
of price change being zero. For the money equations, the estimate
requires inserting in the equations the rate of monetary change that could
be expected to produce a zero price rise. We have estimated this for each
period and country by assuming a real per capita income elasticity of 1.1
for the United States and 0.9 for the United Kingdom, which are roughly
the values suggested by the results of chapter 6.
10
9 Inserting the resultant
value of monetary change in the multiple regression provides the esti-
mates in column 1 of table 10.14.
The estimates for the subperiods are highly erratic, a reflection of the
small number of observations. In particular, the drastic rise from period
to period in the real return for the United Kingdom, as estimated from
the money equations, seems implausible. For all nonwar periods, as a
whole, the results seem much more reasonable and much more in line
with the ex-post real returns as recorded in table 10.1, as the summary in
table 10.15 indicates.
For the three periods combined, the estimated ex-ante real returns are
generally a bit higher than the average realized real rates, implying that
on the average the realized rates were affected more by unanticipated
inflation than by unanticipated deflation.
10.10 Conclusion
A well-developed theory reveals the complexity of the relation be-
tween monetary change and nominal interest rates. In the first place, the
impact effect of unanticipated accelerations or decelerations of monetary
growth is in the opposite direction from the intermediate and long-range
effects. Second, part of the impact effect produces an abrupt shift in the
interest rate (the loanable funds effect) while another produces a con-
tinuing movement (the liquidity effect). Third, the magnitude and time
span of both impact effects depend critically on how rapidly anticipations
adjust, and on the extent to which changes in nominal income take the
form of changes in output and in prices—about which, as we saw in
109. That is, we have multiplied the rate of change of per capita real income by 1.1 or 0.9,
then added the rate of population growth to get the rate of monetary change consistent with
zero price rise. For the United States, the monetary figures used in computing the multiple
correlations were already adjusted for the period before 1903 for increasing financial
sophistication. For both the United States and the United Kingdom the money figures have
been adjusted for dummy variables, as explained in chapter 8.583 Conclusion
Table 10.15 Estimated Real Return on Nominal and Physical Assets, Ex-Post
and Ex-Ante, All Nonwar Periods
Estimated Real Return
Ex-Post (Table 10.1) Ex-Ante (Table 10.14)
Period and Nominal Physical Money Price















chapters 2 and 9, we have neither a well-developed, agreed-on theory nor
any soundly based and simple empirical generalizations. Such changes in
output and prices are the prime source of the intermediate and long-
range effects. Fourth, although the intermediate effects tend to offset and
ultimately completely cancel the impact effects, in the process there are
good grounds for expecting overshooting that produces a cyclical reaction
pattern of interest rates to monetary disturbances. Finally, the long-range
effect operates through price expectations, and these in turn are affected
by monetary disturbances that raise or lower the rate of monetary growth
for long periods at a time and so leave their impress on price movements,
or monetary disturbances that it is widely believed will have this effect
even if they do not in fact—a case that is well exemplified by United
States experience during the free silver movement of the nineteenth
century. Anticipations of inflation will, perhaps later rather than sooner,
make for high nominal interest rates, and anticipations of deflation, for
lower ones.
Unfortunately, there is no equally well developed theory of the effect
of real disturbances on nominal interest rates. We know of course that
changes that raise the real yield on capital will tend to raise nominal rates
and conversely. But beyond this we have no satisfactory analysis of the
time pattern or magnitude of their likely impact on the relation between
nominal and real rates.
In view of the complexity of the effect of monetary disturbances, and
the absence of a well-developed theory of the impact of real disturbances,
it is not surprising that the empirical part of this chapter has produced no
simple generalizations, independent of time and place, that would enable
an observer to predict the effects on nominal interest rates of monetary
change. Our theoretical framework provides important insight into the
empirical behavior of interest rates, but that insight is far richer in
understanding particular episodes than in producing a simple empirical
generalization covering a wide range of such episodes.584 Money and Interest Rates
Our empirical analysis has been devoted largely to two related themes:
the relation between yields on nominal and on physical assets, and the
effect of the level and rate of change of prices on interest rates. Money
enters as a factor producing short-term effects, a large part of which
averages out within the cycle phases that are our unit of analysis, and as a
source of price changes. In principle, price changes arising from other
sources should have the same effects on interest rates as those arising
from monetary change. Yet it turns out that though nominal interest rates
are not very closely connected with current and prior monetary change,
they are more closely connected with such monetary changes than with
current and prior price changes. We conjecture that this result reflects
partly the greater statistical accuracy of our monetary series and partly
the impact and intermediate effects that remain in our phase bases.
10.10.1 Yields on Nominal and Physical Assets
The capital markets that determine the interest rates we study serve the
economic function of mediating between the suppliers of capital, who
prefer to hold assets denominated in nominal terms, and the demanders
of capital, who in the main use the capital to acquire physical assets.
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies, and the
like, which have both assets and liabilities denominated in nominal terms,
complicate and hide but do not invalidate this fundamental function of
the markets in nominal assets. In order to study the relation between the
yields on nominal assets and on physical assets, we have employed the
rate of change of income as a proxy for the yield on physical assets: that of
nominal income as a proxy for the nominal yield on physical assets, and
that of real income as a proxy for the real yield on physical assets. Such
evidence as we could assemble indicates that our proxy, which we initially
used in the analysis of the demand for money, serves its purpose reason-
ably well, certainly far better than any available alternative.
For the century that our data cover, the average yield on nominal assets
was roughly equal to the average yield on physical assets in both the
United States and the United Kingdom—itself one of the bits of evidence
on the validity of our proxy. The nominal yield on short-term assets
averaged 4.2 percent for the United States, 3.5 percent for the United
Kingdom; on long-term assets it averaged 4.8 percent for the United
States, 4.2 percent for the United Kingdom. The real yield, after sub-
tracting the rate of inflation from the nominal yield, averaged roughly 2.6
percent and 3.3 percent for the United States for short- and long-term
assets, 0.9 and 1.7 percent for the United Kingdom. The difference in real
yields is wider than in nominal yields because British prices rose on the
average more rapidly than United States prices, a difference that was
reflected almost precisely in the average behavior of the exchange rate.585 Conclusion
The excess of the United States over the United Kingdom yield varies
greatly over the century. Before 1914, the United Kingdom was a capital
exporter, the United States mainly a capital importer. This situation
implies that the yield on capital would be expected to be higher in the
United States than in the United Kingdom, and that the difference would
be greater than it was after World War I, and this is the case—the excess
of United States over United Kingdom real yields being about one
percentage point higher before 1914 than in subsequent peacetime
periods. Before 1896, the differential between the nominal yields in the
two countries was widened, and from 1896 to 1914 it was narrowed by the
shift from expectations of devaluation and inflation before 1896 arising
out of the free silver campaign, despite the fact of exchange rate stability
and deflation, to confidence in the stability of the dollar-pound exchange
rate and the avoidance of inflation, despite the fact of inflation. This shift
was of course produced by the election of McKinley in 1896 and con-
firmed by a flood of gold, mostly from South Africa. While the United
States-United Kingdom differential in real yields was roughly the same in
the interwar and post-World War II periods, the differential in nominal
rates shifted from higher United States nominal rates to higher United
Kingdom nominal rates as a result of the depreciation of the pound
relative to the dollar.
Like the United Kingdom-United States differential, the relation be-
tween yields on nominal and physical assets varies greatly from period to
period. Equality of yields on nominal and physical assets holds only for
the century as a whole. From phase to phase there was essentially no
relation between the movements in yields on nominal and physical assets.
Over longer periods, the relation depended critically on price move-
ments^—in periods of rising prices, the yield on physical assets tended to
exceed the yield on nominal assets; in periods of falling prices, the yield
on physical assets tended to be less than the yield on nominal assets.
Clearly, a large part of the price movement was not anticipated, so that
lenders did not succeed in advance in protecting the yield on their
nominal assets from being eroded by rising prices, and borrowers did not
succeed in advance in protecting their payments from being raised, in real
terms, by declining prices. These failures to adjust for price movements
had their effect through nominal yields. Between periods displaying
different price movements, the real yields on physical assets were far
more alike than the real yields on nominal assets, but a similar phe-
nomenon does not hold within periods.
10.10.2 Interest Rates and Prices
Perhaps the most important single conclusion from our examination of
the relation between interest rates and prices is to confirm the doubts586 Money and Interest Rates
expressed by Frederick Macaulay in the late 1930s about the validity of
Keynes's unqualified assertion that the "tendency of prices and interest
rates to rise together . . . and to fall together" is "one of the most
completely established empirical facts within the whole field of quantita-
tive economics." This alleged fact, which Keynes properly regarded as
inconsistent with theoretical expectations and so dubbed the "Gibson
paradox," simply is not a fact, at least since 1914. As Macaulay said, "the
exceptions . . . are so numerous and so glaring that they cannot be
overlooked" (p. 185). The relation holds over neither World War I nor
World War II. It is dubious whether it holds for the post-World War II
period, particularly since the middle 1960s. For the period our data
cover, it holds clearly and unambiguously for the United States and the
United Kingdom only for the period from 1880 to 1914, and less clearly
for the interwar period. Dwyer has examined the relation for France,
Germany, and Belgium, as well as for the United States and the United
Kingdom, and finds no clear-cut Gibson phenomenon for the other
countries.
The failure of the relation to hold over wartime price changes—which
means over the major price changes—eliminates the major element of
paradox but nonetheless leaves a striking empirical phenomenon de-
manding an explanation. One of two principal explanations that have
been offered is Fisher's, that the relation between interest rates and price
level reflects a relation between interest rates and the anticipated rate of
price change plus the delayed formation of anticipations by extrapolating
past price changes. The other is Wicksell's, also later in a variant sug-
gested by Keynes, that the relation reflects fluctuations in the real yield
on capital that are transmitted to both prices and nominal interest rates
through commercial banks, which delay the impact of changes in real
yields on nominal rates by altering the quantity of money.
Investigators of the Gibson paradox have increasingly come to reject
both explanations. Our analysis supports the rejection of the Wicksell-
Keynes explanation, partly on the basis of earlier studies by others, partly
because we cannot detect in our data the Gibson phenomenon for real
yields, as well as nominal yields, that is implied by the Wicksell-Keynes
explanation. Our analysis does not, however, support the rejection of the
Fisher explanation. We found that earlier investigators have been misled
because they tested the explanation largely for periods over which the
Gibson phenomenon is nonexistent. The Fisher explanation, plus allow-
ance for such episodic phenomena as the free silver movement in the
United States, seems to us to remain a highly plausible explanation for
the observed relations. However, we are led by this reexamination to
regard the period of past price change entering into the formation of price
anticipations as being distinctly shorter than the period estimated by
Fisher and some others—weights on past price change extending over a587 Conclusion
period covering something like six to nine years, instead of Fisher's
longer periods.
Our data confirm a sharp break in the relation between interest rates
and prices in both the United States and the United Kingdom in the mid-
or late 1960s that has been reported by other investigators. From then on
there is a much closer relation between interest rates and contempo-
raneous rates of inflation than existed earlier. Gibson disappears and the
original Fisher emerges. Apparently lenders and borrowers have been
better able than earlier to protect themselves against price changes.
We are inclined to accept an explanation offered by Benjamin Klein
for this shift: a drastic change in the character of the monetary system
from a largely specie standard to a fiduciary standard and a belated and
gradual recognition of this shift by market participants. At an earlier date
changes in the quantity of money and in price levels in the connected
economies of the United States and the United Kingdom were perceived
to be largely the result of such autonomous events as gold discoveries,
banking developments, including occasional crises, and the like. They
were not, and were not perceived to be, the deliberate consequence of
government policy—though obviously measures by government were
among the autonomous events that affected the quantity of money. The
government was regarded, and regarded itself, as constrained by the
requirement to maintain convertibility of the national money into specie,
directly or indirectly. In recent decades the situation has changed drasti-
cally. Deliberate government management of the quantity of money as
part of a policy of steering or tuning or controlling the economy has taken
the place of the specie standard.
The change in the monetary standard altered the information relevant
to predicting the future course of prices. In addition, it has been accom-
panied by less short-term but more long-term variability in rates of
inflation and by much higher levels of inflation than had been experi-
enced in peacetime in the United States and the United Kingdom during
the period we cover. The result was to provide a greater incentive for
participants in the market to seek to allow for future price movements,
along with a greater possibility of doing so.
The extent of the change may have been exaggerated by the failure of
many investigators to allow for the effect of taxes on the difference
between nominal and real yields on nominal assets. Even a modest
allowance on this score means that borrowers have not succeeded in
protecting themselves at all fully from the effect of inflation on real yields.
Moreover, the apparent shift may prove temporary. Whether it does, or
whether it is carried even further, may very well depend on whether
future rates of inflation remain as high and as variable as in the past
decade (or even higher and more variable) or whether rates of inflation
resume their peacetime behavior.